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Can Carbon Sinks Be Operational? 
 RFF Workshop Proceedings  
Abstract 
An RFF Workshop brought together experts from around the world to assess the feasibility of 
using biological sinks to sequester carbon as part of a global atmospheric mitigation effort. The chapters 
of this proceeding are a result of that effort. Although the intent of the workshop was not to generate a 
consensus, a number of studies suggest that sinks could be a relatively inexpensive and effective carbon 
management tool. The chapters cover a variety of aspects and topics related to the monitoring and 
measurement of carbon in biological systems. They tend to support the view the carbon sequestration 
using biological systems is technically feasible with relatively good precision and at relatively low cost. 
Thus carbon sinks can be operational. 
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Can Carbon Sinks Be Operational? 
RFF Workshop Summary 
Roger A. Sedjo and Michael Toman∗  
On April 30, 2001, Resources for the Future (RFF) hosted a workshop, “Can Carbon 
Sinks Be Operational?” at which participants assessed the feasibility of using biological sinks to 
sequester carbon as part of a global atmospheric mitigation effort. Sequestration involves 
increased uptakes in atmospheric carbon into terrestrial ecosystems or reduced emissions from 
these systems. Much of the emphasis in the workshop was on forest systems, though other forms 
of biological carbon also were considered. 
The RFF carbon sink workshop brought together a number of the world’s foremost 
authorities to examine the operational feasibility of biological sinks. A number of short papers 
were commissioned to address the question from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Forest 
ecologists and economists, as well as specialists in other disciplines, were represented among the 
participants. 
The significant obstacle to an international regime whereby sink activities will be 
encouraged is the perception that sinks are too uncertain to be a viable tool for carbon 
management. Common concerns about sinks that were addressed at the workshop include 
measurement, monitoring, permanence, and leakages and related side effects. If there is 
inadequate confidence in the ability of sinks to contribute to carbon management, international 
negotiators may not fully recognize the contribution of sinks and thus not create mechanisms to 
reward the provision of carbon sequestration services. In this case a market demand for carbon 
sinks would not develop, and the incentives and rewards for supplying carbon storage in 
biological sinks would not materialize.  
Although the RFF workshop was not intended to generate consensus, the strong 
sentiment of many participants was that failure to incorporate sinks in climate mitigation efforts 
would be an unfortunate outcome. A number of studies have suggested that sinks could be 
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relatively inexpensive and effective for carbon management. The forthcoming Third Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change also suggests that the potential of 
sinks to sequester carbon is substantial, often at a low cost. Land use and forestry projects require 
relatively unsophisticated technology, although they may require institutional and political 
change in some countries to be truly effective. While further work is needed to develop effective 
and credible sinks mechanisms, the obstacles are mainly technical and can be overcome.  
It would thus be a mistake, in the view of many workshop participants, for international 
negotiations to circumscribe the role of sinks from the start. In particular, some of the current 
debate over sinks actually is a debate over the stringency of different national emissions targets 
(and associated cost burdens) for “Annex B” (industrialized countries) under the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. This debate should be kept separate from the broader issue of sinks’ potential and the 
steps needed to realize that potential. 
In what follows we summarize the discussion of key issues at the workshop. 
1. Problems of measurement and monitoring for sinks do exist but are manageable. 
The consensus of workshop participants was that sinks can have a substantial effect on 
atmospheric carbon and can be measured and monitored with sufficient accuracy to allow sink 
management, accounting, and financial incentives for carbon sequestration services. It was well 
recognized by this group that some errors in measurement would occur. However, the relevant 
question is, What error is tolerable? Every measurement of greenhouse gas fluxes has some 
element of uncertainty. Techniques and methods of sampling design and measurement of 
individual carbon pools in forestry projects exist and are based on commonly accepted principles 
of forest inventory, soil sampling, and ecological surveys—principles that have been well tested 
throughout the world. Experience has shown that with the use of these techniques, carbon pools 
can readily be estimated to be within ± 10% of the mean, at a modest cost.  
Well-established methods for monitoring carbon stocks typically involve sample plots. 
Additionally, remote-sensing technology, both from satellites and from low-flying airplanes can 
be used. Promising advances in this area include various innovations in camera capacity, filters, 
laser profilers, and so forth. Such systems produce estimates of forest features and biomass that 
are highly correlated with estimates attained with on-the-ground methods. 
Considerable time at the workshop was given to measurement and monitoring issues: 
which pools should be monitored, for example, and which can be ignored if they are too difficult 
or expensive to track. It was agreed that some sinks were more difficult and more costly to 
measure than others. Also, with sampling procedures there is a trade-off between precision and RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Summary  Sedjo and Toman 
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costs. Above-ground biomass, for example, is easier and less costly to measure for a given 
degree of precision than, for example, soils.  Forest soil carbon is, however, highly stable under 
most conditions. Thus, despite the presence of carbon in forest soils, it may be prudent to 
exclude it from estimates of carbon debits or credits, at least until measurement and monitoring 
procedures are further improved.  
One presenter discussed monitoring and verification of carbon in vegetation using 
inventories and remote sensing information—an approach used to measure forest carbon across 
the United States. Other papers addressed carbon measurement for Costa Rica and for pilot 
projects in Bolivia and Brazil. The potential of increasingly sophisticated aerial and remote- 
sensing surveys was noted, and some participants had direct experience with such approaches. 
Sample size and sampling costs were discussed in the context of measurement errors. The 
question of site biomass and carbon for a dynamic, growing forest that also has woody debris 
was addressed.  
2. The issue of permanence is readily solvable. The concern is that most biological 
sinks, including forests, are subject to unplanned disturbances and hence cannot, with a high 
degree of confidence, be built into national or project-level carbon accounting. Many workshop 
participants believe this overstates the problem. Although there will be some variability within 
these systems and individual forest sinks may come and go, the objective is to increase the 
aggregate amount of forest sinks though time. Monitoring can detect major changes in storage, 
and regulatory systems can be designed to hold sink owners responsible for such releases 
through various insurance and payment (and payment withholding) mechanisms. Carbon credit 
users would obtain extra credits through financial bonds that allowed additional carbon credits to 
be purchased on the sport market. 
Disturbances and risks are a cause for concern for individual projects and may make 
incentive system payments more complicated, but unless there is a regionwide (or global) 
increase in disturbances, the law of large numbers suggests that individual failures are still 
consistent with a net increase in carbon sink mitigation. Furthermore, risk and uncertainty are not 
unique to carbon sinks and can be addressed through various insurance schemes, whether 
external or self-insurance, public or private. 
3. Getting the baseline right is a problem, but not a problem unique to biological 
sinks. Baseline issues arise in connection with energy projects as well as sink projects. 
Moreover, project baselines and national baselines involve different problems. Where the 
baseline is tied to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, as in Article 3.3 of the Kyoto RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Summary  Sedjo and Toman 
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Protocol, the establishment of a baseline involving those activities is reasonably straightforward. 
However, where a comprehensive approach is called for, as might be interpreted in Article 3.4, 
the problem becomes more complex and may involve a national system of sink monitoring. 
 Identifying the portion of changes in carbon storage due to management is challenging. 
Furthermore, although developed countries may have the resources and expertise to establish a 
reasonable baseline, developing countries may not. However, the importance of getting the 
baseline right can vary with the circumstances, such as the way that incentives are structured.  
Consider, for example, a case in which transitions between land use categories 
(particularly forest and agricultural land) in the absence of any policy are relatively small. This 
probably characterizes the overall U.S. situation but it may not be the case for many developing 
countries. Suppose a subsidy is offered for the conversion of agricultural land to forest. Since 
baseline conversions of agricultural land to forest are small, most conversions observed when the 
policy is in effect could be attributed to the specific policy. To compute the change in carbon, 
one need only consider those acres that changed from agriculture to forest, since all other land 
use transitions—forest to forest, agriculture to agriculture, forest to agriculture—are the same 
both in the baseline and under the policy. The change in carbon for all acres that changed from 
agriculture to forest gives us a pretty good estimate of the change in carbon that can be attributed 
to the policy, and to the extent that these differ, we know the direction of the bias. 
Although that argument works for a conversion subsidy, it may not work for a 
conservation subsidy in developing countries. In the case of the conservation subsidy, 
landowners would be paid to keep their land in forest. But what we observe under the policy is 
not a good approximation of the effects of the conservation policy: Many owners of forest land 
would keep their land in forest without the policy. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to sort out 
the owners who conserved their land in response to the policy and those who would have done 
this in any case. In other words, we need to identify the relevant baseline. 
4. Leakage is a legitimate concern when monitoring forest carbon sinks. Leakage 
arises when activities undertaken in a specific sequestration project have ramifications outside 
the project that affect its global goals. The most obvious leak is the creation of a protected forest, 
in which the carbon pool is protected, that deflects the pressures for deforestation to a similar 
forest elsewhere. Project leakage can be accounted for through the use of a countrywide baseline. 
In the absence of such baselines, rules of thumb will have to be developed to make rough 
corrections for leakage.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Summary  Sedjo and Toman 
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5. Liability for failed sequestration projects remains an active area of discussion. 
Some participants argued that liability should fall on the seller when the project is in an Annex B 
country with an effective national carbon cap; but liability for specific sequestration projects in 
developing countries should reside with buyers. The liability issue might also be substantially 
lessened through a process of carbon “renting,” in which payments are made on a periodic basis, 
after the sequestration service has been provided.  
The short papers generated for the workshop bring together a variety of views and 
perspectives on carbon sinks. Although differences exist among the workshop participants, the 
reader of the papers will detect substantial agreement on the critical problems and how they may 
be addressed. The fact that carbon offsets are being created by the private sector and traded 
nationally and internationally indicates the market’s early recognition of the importance of 
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•B i o m a s s
– Adequacy of equations
– Coarse roots
• Coarse woody debris and litter
– Methods available – needs implementation
• Soils
– Need efficient indicators and sampling protocols
– Account for “legacy effects” of past land use
• Wood products and landfills
– New products and changes in technology
– Imports and exportsAccounting Issues
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• Additionality →→→→
– What is the baseline? Does baseline = BAU?
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• Longevity and stability of stocks
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NOTE: units are  
volume not massConsiderations for Implementing a 
Forest Carbon Sequestration Program
• Define roles of public agencies, private sector
• Landowner objectives – is increased carbon 
sequestration compatible with other objectives? 
•A   suite of practices may be effective
• Practices must be tailored to specific forest 
ecosystems which are highly diverse
• Knowledge of specific practices to apply in 
different situations is lacking
• Experience with programs suggests that incentives 
are required to engage landownersBarriers to Increasing Forest Carbon 
Sequestration
• Infrastructure may be 
lacking (e.g. nurseries to 
produce tree seedlings)
• Lack complete knowledge 
of how forest practices 
affect ecosystem carbon 
pools
• Landowner assistance 
programs specific to 
carbon sequestration must 
be developed



























Tree Planting in the U.S.
USDA Forest ServiceMonitoring Considerations in the U.S.
• Existing national inventory programs are speeding 
up and expanding coverage
– Goal is 5-year cycle nationwide
– “Wall-to-wall” sampling is envisioned
– Filling gaps in ecosystem carbon pools
• Project-level monitoring feasible but not as part of 
National strategic monitoring
• International context regarding C accounting:
– Accounting components and methods not yet defined
– Methods must be transparent and verifiable
– Possible need to separate direct from indirect causes
• Techniques research is ongoing
– Part of mission of various research programsForest Carbon Research Needs
• Improve accuracy and precision in understanding, 
monitoring and predicting carbon storage and release
• Develop comprehensive carbon accounting models
• Predict carbon storage and dynamics based on 
conditions and management
• Develop and demonstrate management systems for 
increased productivity and carbon sequestration
• Develop cost-effective, low-impact forest operations 
systems
• Increase the durability, quality, and uses of wood 
products 
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A Pool Paradigm: Monitoring and Verification of Carbon in 
Vegetation Using Inventory and Remote Sensing Information 
Pekka E. Kauppi* 
Introduction 
The objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) at levels that do not cause harmful 
effects. I have earlier suggested that this goal may be too ambitious (Kauppi 1995); nevertheless, 
stabilizing the concentrations at the lowest possible levels appears important and reasonable. 
This paper deals only with carbon dioxide, omitting other GHGs. Carbon dioxide is probably the 
hardest gas to control. The policy objective considered here is the stabilization of the carbon 
dioxide concentration at the lowest possible level. 
As the volume of the atmosphere can be assumed constant, concentration can be 
expressed as the pool of carbon in the atmosphere. This pool, measured in gigatons (Gt), has 
increased as follows (Siegenthaler and Sarmiento, 1993; ORNL CDIAC 2000): 
1800             600 Gt 
1980–1989   750 
2000             789 
Since our policy objective is to minimize this number (the pool and, hence, the 
concentration), the lower the pool at any given time, the better. Analysis and debate are needed 
on variants of this goal over different time spans. Given the momentum of the world energy and 
land use system, it will not be possible to stabilize the carbon pool of the atmosphere in, say, the 
next 30 years. But is it desirable to minimize the pool in the next 50, 100, or 150 years? 
Sink policies need to be integrated into the control of fossil fuel emissions. Sinks can 
make an additional and incremental contribution to climate policy, reinforcing the effect of 
emissions reductions. One can wonder, though, whether the approach of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which puts fossil fuel emissions and sinks in the same basket, is optimal. 
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Here I suggest an independent and separate regulatory policy addressing the rates of 
fossil fuel emissions, with a complementary policy for the sinks. The sink issues could be treated 
by focusing not on the rates but on the pools. The carbon pool in the vegetation and soils of the 
global land ecosystems is 1,000 to 2,000 Gt (IPCC 2000)—much larger than the current pool of 
carbon in the atmosphere (790 Gt). “Pool paradigm” implies that maximizing the carbon pool in 
land ecosystem is a tool for minimizing the pool in the atmosphere. 
What about substitution—that is, using renewable biomass to substitute the use of fossil 
fuel reserves? I suggest considering substitution as an instrument for reducing fossil fuel 
emissions. By definition, substitution has an impact on the rates of fossil fuel emissions. If the 
regulatory policies for the emissions were separate from those for the sinks, substitution would 
be treated as an element of emissions policies.That would reduce the scope of sink policies to the 
relatively feasible task of maximizing the carbon pool in land ecosystems at, for example, a 
national level. 
The objective of this paper has been to introduce the pool paradigm for consideration in 
the policy dabate. If the pool paradigm is adopted, monitoring, modeling, verifying, and 
predicting changes in the carbon pools of vegetation and soils appear critical. Referring to two 
submitted manuscripts, I present the latest methodologies and preliminary findings on carbon 
pools, and the changes of carbon pool in the forest vegetation of the boreal and temperate zones. 
Methods 
First, Liski et al. (2001) collected and assessed the latest information describing the 
carbon pool in forest vegetation over large geographic areas. The data came from a recent 
international study (ECE/FAO 2000). Liski et al. (2001) essentially updates the results of Dixon 
et al. (1994), though only for about half of the global forest area (forests in the temperate and 
boreal regions). The ECE/FAO 2000 observations are six to eight years more recent than those 
reported in Dixon et al. (1994). In some cases the new data are more reliable because the 
methods have improved.  
Second, Myneni et al. (2001) have combined remote sensing observations with the 
ECE/FAO data and produced estimates of the carbon pool in vegetation on a grid of 8×8 km for 
North America and Eurasia. The latter study, in particular, adopted the pool paradigm, and flux 
data on growth rates, removals, and mortality rates were not needed. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kauppi 
3 
Results and Discussion 
Both studies showed a larger carbon sink in the forest vegetation of the study region than 
the one reported seven years earlier (Dixon et al. 1994). Liski et al. (2001) showed that the net 
annual increment (NAI) has increased in all regions and has enhanced the vegetation carbon 
pool, because annual fellings have either increased less than NAI or decreased, as in the case of 
Russia (Figure 1). Myneni et al. (2001) observed similar general patterns, showed larger 
geographic details, and used a consistent methodology for all countries, unlike ECE/FAO (2000), 
in which inventory methods vary from country to country. For verification purposes, the method 
in Myneni et al. (2001) appears promising because field verification can be organized in grid 
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Figure 1. Net annual increment, annual fellings, and annual increase in growing stock, 
the latter calculated as the difference between the former two, of trees in temperate and 
boreal forests in the 1980s and the 1990s. Inventories labeled “1980s” were taken in 
some countries in the late 1970s. Net annual increment is the gross stemwood volume 
increment less the stemwood volume of trees or stands that die naturally from fire, 
insects, disease, etc. Growing stock is the stemwood volume of living standing trees. 
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Making Sinks Operational in the Kyoto Protocol 
Ian Noble* 
Introduction 
Sinks￿uptakes to or reductions in emissions from terrestrial ecosystems￿can make a 
significant contribution in slowing the rate of buildup of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the 
atmosphere. However, there are two significant threats to establishing an international regime 
whereby sink activities will be encouraged: first, that international negotiations will not fully 
recognize their contribution, and second, that the uncertainties and costs of trading sink 
sequestrations may damage market confidence in them and thus lose the capital flow that is 
essential.  
Clearly, it is essential that the Kyoto Protocol￿a variant or an entirely new version￿be 
ratified if sinks are to have any reality. The prevailing view is that this largely depends on 
reengaging the United States and the European Union (EU) in productive discussions. This paper 
is written with the assumption that such a reengagement will be achieved, and that individual 
parties￿ attitudes toward sinks are largely determined by the relative advantage or disadvantage 
to be realized from their inclusion in the protocol.  
Reengaging the United States 
I suggest that the United States will not move to ratification of any protocol unless this 
country will clearly be able to comply in the first commitment period(s). Currently, U.S. 
emissions are roughly 300 million tons of carbon (MtC) per year over its assigned amount, 
although significant reductions to emissions can be made via energy efficiencies and the 
increased application of current technology before the first commitment period. However, sinks
                                                 




play a pivotal role in the U.S. position, both in credits that may be gained from internal actions 
and in a reduced price of carbon if substantial sink opportunities are included in the flexibility 
mechanisms. 
Land Use Interpretations 
The proposal put forward by the United States before the Conference of the Parties 6 
(COP 6) sought to claim just over 300 MtC/yr from a radically different interpretation of Article 
3.4. It sought credit for carbon accumulating in forests, rangelands, and croplands. The proposal 
is consistent with the ￿broad land-based approach￿ to accounting outlined in the Special Report 
on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in 2000 (IPCC Special Report). However, the U.S. proposal has been criticized on two 
grounds.  
First, it seeks credit for processes initiated long before 1990 but maintained by continuing 
management action (or inaction) since then. It also would capture some of the ￿free ride￿ that 
arose from the increased uptake of carbon by terrestrial ecosystems due to increased CO2 
concentrations, nitrogen inputs, and warming. The United States said it was proposing a 
￿comprehensive approach would best account for the full range of natural and human activities 
that could affect the global climate system,￿ an approach it said was ￿also consistent with the 
nature of the agreement struck at Kyoto, which was intended to include [land use, land use 
change, and forestry, or LULUCF] in a manner that would result in significant additions in the 
first commitment period to the assigned amount of countries that are sequestering large amounts 
of carbon (including the United States).￿ 
Was there a clear understanding at Kyoto that credit would be given only for actions to 
reduce emissions or increase uptakes taken since the beginning of 1990? Much of the text of the 
protocol suggests this, including the 1990 baselines for nonsink emissions and the post-1990 
requirement for activities for Article 3.3 and similarly for Article 3.4 in the first commitment 
period. President Pronk has recently confirmed his view on this in ￿New Proposals by the 
President of COP 6￿ (April 9, 2001). The argument is that the Kyoto Protocol is an attempt to 
make a significant change in the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and thus 
changes that were already in chain before the negotiations leading up to the protocol (taken as 
January 1, 1990) should not be credited. 
But there have always been different interpretations of Article 3.4 about the validity of 
including activities that began before 1990 and were maintained after that date. Similar questions RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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could be raised about the decision to shift from coal to gas in the United Kingdom, or when the 
decision was made to move toward reunification of Germany and the revival of the East German 
industries. The United States might claim that ongoing uptake from land management decisions 
made many decades before the Kyoto Protocol but maintained by active decisions up to 1997 
and since is equivalent to the above cases. If that is true, then was that fully understood by all 
parties at Kyoto? My interpretation was that it was not, and I find it surprising that the United 
States waited so long to clarify its understanding. 
The second criticism of the U.S. proposal is that the country would gain credit for 
processes that many see as not being human induced. The best estimates of the dynamics of the 
global carbon budget indicate that a net 2.3 gigatons of carbon (GtC) per year are being taken up 
by terrestrial ecosystems mainly a result of CO2 fertilization, warming, and nitrogen deposition, 
but also including the increase of biomass in forests and woodlands as a result of changes in 
management practices over past decades (IPCC Special Report). A rough estimate suggests that 
at least 1 GtC/yr of the worldwide 2.3 GtC/yr is being taken up in industrialized, Annex 1 
countries. This is more than enough to reduce emissions below business-as-usual projections to 
meet the emissions reduction targets defined at Kyoto. The United States has argued that the vast 
majority of the estimated land-based uptakes are attributable to changes in past management 
regimes rather than ￿greenhouse￿ effects. However, it recognized that some of the claims might 
be contentious by noting in that some discounting might be necessary. 
Renegotiating the Protocol 
A common complaint about the Kyoto Protocol is that the targets were set before the 
costs were known. There could be a reorientation of the current protocol and possibly a 
renegotiation of the differentiated targets, or the process could use an entirely different basis.  
McKibbin and Willcoxen1 of the Brookings Institute have made one such proposal (see 
Appendix 1), which seems to encompass the use of sinks within national boundaries to achieve 
compliance, but only if they are available for less than their base price of $10 per tonne of carbon 
for emissions permits.  
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The European Union’s Skeptical Position 
The EU has taken a much more skeptical approach to sinks than many other nations. 
Most EU parties have less to gain from the comprehensive inclusion of sinks in a protocol than 
do their trading partners. Their criticisms have been wide-ranging, and I will deal with some of 
them below, under ￿Threats to Sinks.￿ Other criticisms relate to the inclusion of sinks in the 
CDM.  
It is often implied by commentators, nongovernmental organizations, and sometimes 
delegates to the negotiations that there is something suspicious about the so-called Australia 
Clause, the second sentence of Article 3.7. I have argued elsewhere (Noble and Scholes 2000, 
and see Appendix 3) that this clause is an essential component of a gross-net accounting system. 
It is clear that without it Australia may well not have even become a signatory to the protocol. 
The effect of the clause, coupled with Australia￿s ￿generous￿ target of 108%, means that 
Australia can achieve compliance in the first commitment period despite an almost 2% annual 
increase in emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes. However, it does require that 
Australia significantly reduce its land clearing￿no simple task in a federation of states where 
land management is a state matter. Australia faces continuing uncertainty about the amount of 
carbon uptake due to the invasion of woody plants into areas that were grasslands or open 
woodlands under indigenous land management. The operation of Article 3.7 in Australia depends 
upon on the precise amount of invasion and clearing of such areas, and there is a debate about 
whether the process is human induced. The issue of ￿woody weeds,￿ as this invasion is often 
called, is likely to be contentious in future negotiations over sinks, as woody weeds appear to 
constitute a significant part of the U.S. claim under Article 3.4.  
Loss of Market Trust in Sinks 
Another threat to sinks in the protocol is the loss of market trust that sinks can be 
measured with sufficient accuracy and at reasonable cost so that they can be incorporated in a 
trading system. Another threat, still rarely discussed, is the variability of the emissions and 
uptakes from sinks over time spans of a year to five years.  
Overcoming the Threats 
Accounting Standards RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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There seems to be a view in some quarters that it is necessary to account for every tonne 
of carbon. Doing so will bring with it enormous costs, and I do not believe that this is necessary. 
What is important is that any omission or miscount err on the side of the atmosphere; that is, that 
accounting during a commitment period overestimate emissions and underestimate uptakes. This 
leaves entities free to choose measurement and accounting systems most appropriate to their 
particular cost-benefit analysis. 
What Error Is Tolerable?  
It is difficult to conceive of an emissions trading system in which the credits are not fully 
fungible. Thus, it is essential that all credits appearing on the market convey with them the same 
minimum level of greenhouse gas reduction and surety that this will persist. However, questions 
have been raised as to whether it is possible to measure some important carbon pools￿
particularly soil carbon￿with sufficient accuracy. 
Every measurement of greenhouse gas fluxes or changes in stocks has some element of 
uncertainty. This is particularly a problem using a stock change method, as recommended under 
Article 3.3. Simple calculations quantify the error in calculating the incremental loss or gain of 
carbon in a pool when the pool is measured at the beginning and end of a commitment period:  
95% confidence limits of the change in stocks =  
    2.8 * Sampling error 
--------------------------------- 
 Proportional change * √ n 
where sampling error refers to the inherent error in the measurement (here, the ratio of 
the standard deviation to the mean of any soil carbon), proportional change is the change in soil 
carbon being measured, and n is the number of independent samples of the change made at a site. 
This implies that unless the error associated with the measurement technique is at least an order 
of magnitude smaller than the proportional increment being estimated, large numbers of samples 
will need to be taken at each site. For example, if the increment in soil carbon over the 
commitment period is 1% but the error of the sampling procedure is also ± 1%, then about 100 
samples will need to be taken to reduce the 95% confidence limits of the estimate of the change 
in stocks to ± 14% of the mean estimate. Thus, although it is technically feasible to estimate small 
changes in stocks with relatively insensitive methods, the number of samples required increases 
dramatically, and along with it, the costs. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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Impermanence 
Expiring CERsThe Colombian proposal for expiring CERs is a commonsense approach 
to the permanence issue in sink projects. While the CERs survive, via either the original contract 
or any renewal, they should be regularly monitored, just like any other sequestration or emissions 
reduction, to ensure their validity. But once the CERs are allowed to expire, it is assumed that the 
CO2 is immediately returned to the atmosphere. 
Obviously, liability for replacing the CERs, whether by extending the existing project, 
with new expiring CERs, or with more permanent credits, remains with the buyer. I suggest that 
liability should also rest with the buyer if the CERs expire early because of a breakdown in the 
original contract. The buyer may wish to negotiate insurance, penalty clauses, or lower prices to 
buffer losses of this kind.  
Annual Variability in Sinks 
There has been little consideration of the effect of climatic and other environmental 
variability on the uptake of carbon by sinks. At national scales the annual fluxes vary with 
weather patterns over the year. For large nations there tends to be a spatial averaging, as some 
regions experience better growing conditions and others, poorer. However, large-scale weather 
patterns, such as El Niæo, do cause significant variation in the global uptake. 
Annual variability becomes particularly acute in emissions trading associated with 
projects confined to a geographical location. Appendix 2 shows some calculations for a proposed 
trading scheme in which the validity of the traded certificates was guaranteed by allowing sellers 
to sell only a proportion of the best estimate of the sequestration expected from a project during 
the first commitment period. Simple calculations show that even if relatively risky positions are 
taken (e.g., in two of three projects, the predicted sequestration will be met or exceeded), only 
70% of the best estimate of that sequestration should be traded. With a more conservative 
approach, the figure drops to 50%￿a significant discount in the value of carbon sequestration in 
land-based sinks. Managing a pool of projects over a wider geographical range can reduce the 
overall risk; however, other forms of risk, such as losses due to disturbances, also need to be 
taken into account.  
Fires 
Current accounting systems do not deal adequately with fire. The IPCC guidelines (1996) 
for national accounting under the Framework Convention on Climate Change  recommend that RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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the emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases from savanna and agricultural burning be accounted 
for, but CO2 emissions are not included. The global emissions of GHG from burning each year 
are significant but in the long term are balanced by increased uptake of carbon during 
regeneration following fire. However, this approximation breaks down when applied to 
accounting under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Changes in the fire regime can lead to significant changes in carbon stocks. For example, 
Houghton et al. (2000) estimate that from 1950 to 1990 the policy of fire prevention, introduced 
early in the century, led to the accumulation of more than 200 MtC/yr. This is a significant 
component of the uptakes claimed by the United States under its interpretation of Article 3.4 in 
the leadup to COP6. There are other hidden errors in national accounts. For example, Australia 
bases the uptake by managed forests for its 1990 baseline on the age structure of the forest types 
and their associated growth rates. A significant component of these growth rates is the 
contribution of fast-growing forests recovering from fire. However, the calculations do not 
include the losses due to fires, as these are assumed to be balanced by the enhanced uptakes. 
Thus, the accounting is unbalanced.  
Those errors are subtle and probably not important compared with the quantities of 
emissions involved in the negotiations of the differentiated targets. However, the problem of 
fires arises again in emissions trading. If an area subject to traded CERs or ERUs is burned, it 
might be expected that the carbon losses will be made up by the selling party though either a 
backup site (i.e., underselling their stock of accumulated carbon) or insurance. However, under 
IPCC guidelines this will not be reflected in the national accounts. 
In summary, very little thought has been given to the whole area of year-by-year 
variability and in particular to the role of disturbances, especially fires, in the accounting and 
trading system. I believe that the issues are complex but nevertheless soluble. 
Can Sinks Make a Difference without the CDM? 
I have avoided any significant discussion of sinks in the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) in deference to the greater expertise of other speakers. However, I wish to conclude by 
arguing that terrestrial sinks provide an opportunity to buy time while technological change and 
innovation occur. The global capacity is significant but ultimately limited. The goal of any 
agreement on reducing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere should be to encourage the use of all 
sink opportunities that are cost effective and whose social or environmental effects do not 
outweigh their benefits. Any protocol should provide incentives to create new sinks or emissions RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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reductions and no disincentives for those already in place from either ￿natural￿ or human-
induced processes. 
The IPCC Special Report shows that the greatest sink opportunities are in the developing 
world. The restriction of sinks to Annex 1 countries and to Article 3.3 and a narrow 
interpretation of Article 3.4 would buy very little time. It would also have a major impact on the 
price of carbon credits in the first commitment period, as many studies have shown. 
Some European commentators have expressed the view that sinks are an unnecessary 
complication to the Kyoto Protocol and are largely the reason for the current impasse (see, for 
example, the comments by Svend Auken, Danish Minister of Environment and Energy, at the 
Pew Center, April 18, 20012). If credits for sink activities are restricted to Annex 1 countries, or 
if loopholes allow preexisting uptakes to be counted, that view will be largely true. However, I 
think it is important that a way to operationalize sinks in their widest context be found, thereby 
allowing time for the social and technological changes to a society less dependent on fossil fuel 
emissions. 
                                                 
2 See www.pewclimate.org/events/auken.cfm RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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Appendix 1 
Key Elements of the McKibbin-Wicoxen Proposal 
All countries create two assets: 
1.  an emissions permit, which is required by fossil fuel industries to supply a unit of 
carbon annually; and 
2.  an emissions endowment, which gives the owner an emissions permit every year 
forever. 
All countries create two domestic markets: 
3.  a domestic emissions permit trading system with a fixed price of $US10 per ton of 
carbon in Annex 1 countries and a cap price of $US10 in non-Annex 1 countries; and  
4.  a domestic emissions endowment trading system with a flexible price. 
In 2000, all countries are allowed to make a once-only allocation of emissions 
endowments domestically based on Kyoto targets for Annex 1 countries and current emissions 
plus a percentage to be determined for non-Annex 1 countries. Trading in both markets begins 
January 2001. 
Permits must be reconciled against production or imports of carbon on an annual basis at 
the top of the carbon production chain (coal mines, oil refineries, gas refiners). Production that is 
exported is exempted. 
Every decade there is a meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC to 
evaluate the extent of abatement and the state of climate science, and to negotiate new prices for 
permits. 
 RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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Appendix 2 
Uncertainty in Trading Sinks  
The commodity to be traded is the amount of carbon sequestered from the start of 2008 to 
the end of 2012 on land falling under Article 3.3 (often interpreted as deliberately established 
forest on land that was not forested in 1990). There may be opportunities to trade carbon 
sequestered in other circumstances, but this discussion is limited to the above. 
In forecasting this amount, the following information is required: 
•  An estimate of the area of forest (A). 
•  An estimate of the carbon at the start of 2008. 
•  An estimate of the increment in carbon through the end of 2012. 
Projecting forest growth is a standard part of forest practice used in management, 
planning, and forecasting future harvests and sales. Usually, yield tables and models are used to 
forecast the cubic volume of timber. To covert such estimates to carbon, three factors are needed: 
5.  A conversion of the volume of log to carbon content. This can be calculated by 
multiplying by wood density and the carbon content of wood. 
6.  An expansion factor to allow for the nonlog biomass (and carbon) in branches, bark, 
and leaves. 
7.  A similar conversion factor to allow for below-ground carbon. 
Each of the above estimates is subject to uncertainties, which will vary by species, 
growing conditions, individuals, and stand age.  
Here we assume that below-ground carbon changes little, and thus item 3 is ignored. 
Separate rules will be required to exclude stands in which this assumption about soils may not be 
true, or more particularly, where root and soil carbon may be lost. 
Items 1 and 2 above can be combined into a single conversion factor (E) that converts 
forecasted log volume to above-ground carbon for that site. 
Thus, the final equation for estimating the tradeable carbon is: 
Carbon =  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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Area * Log volume per ha at the start of 2008* proportional growth increment of that log 
volume over commitment period (2008 through 2012) * E 
orC =  A * L * G * E 
The equation is expressed in the form of the product of four largely independent 
variables, and in this form the uncertainty of the overall result can be calculated from a simple 






Here U is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean for each variable.  
Once we have calculated UC, a conservative estimate of the amount of carbon to be 
traded can be made. For example, nine of ten forest stands will have a tradable carbon content of 
greater than: 
C * (1 ￿ p * UC) 
where p = 1.65. If a less conservative approach to trading is used, the value of p would be 
lower (eg. 1.28 for four of five stands, and 0.97 for two of three). 
Rough Estimates of the Uncertainties 
UA can usually be measured with high certainty. For example, sd/mean = 0.02 and maybe 
up to 0.05. 
UL depends on a number of factors, but by using 2000 data as a starting point, we require 
projections of growth over the next seven years. Climatic variability sets a lower limit to the 
uncertainty (i.e., a minimum value for sd/mean). If variation in annual rainfall is taken as a guide 
to the effect of climatic variability on growth, then most forestry areas have a sd/mean for annual 
rainfall of about 0.24 with higher values in drier areas. Variation from year to year is 
approximately independent4, and thus variation in the growth over seven years would be reduced 
by approximately 1/√7. These estimates are very approximate and fail to take into account the 
uncertainty of the growth behavior of stands. They can, however, be determined more directly by 
                                                 
3 See standard texts or IPCC Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
 
4 El Niæo and similar phenomena lead to autocorrelation in annual weather patterns RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
12 
reference to forest plots, growth rings, etc. They can also be partly estimated from models such 
as CO2FIX, CAMFOR etc5. Preliminary runs with CAMFOR suggest that the uncertainty 
introduced by uncertainty in parameterization is only about 0.07, although I suspect that this 
estimate is low. However, models that are derived from particular species and silvicultural 
practices should have a low uncertainty. There is also an uncertainty associated with the estimate 
of the starting log volume in 2000, but this should be of the order of sd/mean = 0.05, as it can be 




2) = 0.17 
A similar limit to certainty due to climatic variation applies to the estimate of UG. In this 
case estimates are over five years of growth, which means that the minimum values for sd/mean 
are 0.24 divided by √5￿that is, 0.11￿and the full uncertainty is: 
UG = √(0.24
2/√5 + 0.07
2) = 0.18 
UE is more difficult to estimate and probably has the greatest uncertainty. It is most likely 
that sd/mean is of the order 0.20 or higher. It may be lower for stands of well-known species 
growing in well-known locations. 





2) = √0.1002 = 0.32 
This would mean that if a rule that nine of the ten forest stands entering an estate had to 
be above the traded carbon content, then the maximum proportion of the best estimate of carbon 
content that could be traded is about 50%. However, this result is strongly affected by the value 
for UE. If the value is reduced to 0.1, then the proportion that could be traded rises to 60%. If in 
addition the rule is reduced to two of three, the proportion that could be traded increases again to 
70%. 
The above calculations represent a very rough investigation of the nature of the problem. 
Each of the steps needs to be dealt with in more detail by reference to forest datasets and 
evaluation of the actual yield projection models being used. 
                                                 
5 These models are usually not responsive to year by year climatic variations, and thus can be used only to assess the 
uncertainties that may be inherent in parameterising the growth projection model per se. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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The message from the rough analysis is that without more detailed analyses, trading more 
than 50% to 60% of the estimated carbon content even on the best-estimated stands would be 
risky. If the tradable proportion is to be increased, then the uncertainty about the conversion 
factor (essentially, stand volume to stand carbon) must be reduced. The inherent uncertainty due 
to climatic variation also needs to be checked, although even if the sensitivity to climate were 
half that estimated above, then the tradable proportions would be increased by only 5% to 10%. 
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Appendix 3 
(From Noble and Scoles 2000, Climate Policy, Volume 1) 
The “gross-net” issue and Article 3.7 
The Kyoto Protocol specifies what is called the ￿gross-net￿ approach to accounting for 
carbon. That is, the 1990 baseline used for setting assigned amounts is based on aggregate 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A of the Protocol. Annex A 
includes emissions from the energy, industrial processes, solvent and other product use, 
agriculture, and waste sectors (￿industrial sectors￿). A land-use change and forestry (LUCF) 
sector, which includes both emissions and sinks, was excluded late in the course of the 
negotiations. However, many parties felt that some of the opportunities for increased uptake in 
sinks should be counted and that Articles 3.3 and 3.4 should allow a limited set of LUCF-sector 
emissions and sinks to contribute to compliance during commitment periods. Hence the 
accounting model is often referred to as a gross-net system. That is, assigned amounts are based 
on gross (but not fully inclusive) emissions, and compliance includes some additional activities 
where net emissions (emissions minus sinks) are calculated. 
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 also limit the sources and sinks to be counted in the first commitment 
period to those resulting from activities since 1990. If this qualification had not been added, then 
all nations with a net sink in the allowed LUCF activities would have received an amount 
equivalent to that net sink as a windfall toward compliance (compare country A under Rules 3 
and 4 in Appendix Table 2a).  
In contrast, countries with significant land-clearing and consequently net emissions from 
LUCF activities would be penalized by a gross-net accounting system (compare countries A and 
C under Rule 4). Article 3.7 (Rule 5) helps redress this problem by allowing countries ￿for whom 
land use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990￿ (the 
￿trigger￿) to include net emissions from ￿land-use change for the purposes of calculating their 
assigned amount.￿ 
There have been many queries as to why the trigger for Article 3.7 is ￿land use change 
and forestry￿ but only land use change is included in calculating the assigned amount. Also, 
some have noted that a country￿s situation changes significantly according to whether it is just 
above or below the trigger (see countries D and E under Rule5).  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Noble 
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A common suggestion is that forestry be included in calculating the assigned amount (see 
Rule 6), but this defeats the purpose of Article 3.7, since it reintroduces a penalty for forestry 
sinks, as in Rule 3. A better rule would have been to omit forestry from the trigger clause (Rule 
7); however, this would mean that any nation with significant land use change and especially 
land clearing would have come under Article 3.7. Rule 7 is a symmetric accounting of 
greenhouse gases, in that the assigned amount is based on emissions, and compliance is based on 
that same set of emissions with the additional incentive to increase sinks in Kyoto lands. 
There have been suggestions that the trigger component of Article 3.7 be removed and 
the adjustment to the assigned amount be applied to all countries. Forestry could be included or 
excluded in calculating the assigned amount (Rules 8 and 9). In either case the outcome is 
equitable to all countries, in that the required reductions in emissions from the industrial sectors 
are about the same. If forestry is included in calculating the assigned amount, then all countries 

















Industrial emissions 1990 I 100 100 100 100 100
Forest sinks 1990 F90 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Land-clearing emissions 1990 C90 0 0 20 11 9
Forest sinks 2010 F10 -8 -3 -8 -8 -8
Kyoto forest sinks 2010 K -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
Land-clearing emissions  2010 C10 0 0 20 11 9
QELRO Q 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
2010 Target for industrial emissions IT (negative is a required reduction in emissions)
Rule
1N e t - n e t A  =  Q  *  ( I  +  F 9 0  +  C 9 0 ) A 8 18 19 99 18 9 1
All carbon sources and sinks A - (I + F10 + K + C10) IT -9 -14 -11 -10 -10
2 Gross-gross A = Q * I A 90 90 90 90 90 2
Only "industrial" emissions A - I IT -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
3 Gross-net A = Q * I A 90 90 90 90 90 3
Full inclusion of "sinks" in compliance A - (I + F10 + K + C10) IT 0 -5 -20 -11 -9
4 Gross-net as in Kyoto Protocol but no 3.7 A = Q * I A 90 90 90 90 90 4
"Sinks" limited to post 1990 activities A - (I + C10 + K) IT -8 -8 -28 -19 -17
5 Gross-net Kyoto & A3.7 as in Protocol if (F90 + C90) > 0 then A = Q * (I + C90) else A = Q * I A 90 90 108 100 90 5
Strict Kyoto Protocol A - (I + C10 + K) IT -8 -8 -10 -9 -17
6 Gross-net Kyoto & modified A3.7 if (F90 + C90) > 0 then A = Q * (I + F90 + C90) else A = Q * I A 90 90 99 91 90 6
Forestry included in assigned amount A - (I + C10 + K) IT -8 -8 -19 -18 -17
7 Gross-net Kyoto & modified A3.7 if (C90) > 0 then A = Q * (I + C90) else A = Q * I A 90 90 108 100 98 7
Trigger and assigned amount exclude forestry A - (I + C10 + K) IT -8 -8 -10 -9 -9
8 Gross-net Kyoto & modified A3.7 A = Q * (I+F90+C90) A 81 81 99 91 89 8
A3.7 applied to all parties A - (I + C10 + K) IT -17 -17 -19 -18 -18
9 Gross-net Kyoto & modified A3.7 A = Q * (I+C90) A 90 90 108 100 98 9




Appendix Table 3a.  
The outcome of applying nine accounting rules to five hypothetical countries (A to 
E). Each country has the same emissions from its fossil fuel and industrial sectors but different 
emissions and sinks associated with its land use change and forestry sectors. The table shows the 
assigned amounts (A) and the change required in the fossil fuel emissions and industrial sectors 
(IT) to allow each country to meet its assigned amount in the first commitment period. Negative 
numbers represent sinks or reductions in emissions. The IT rows give an indication of the 
difficulties that the industrial sectors in each country would face in compliance. Negative 
numbers in this column represent required emissions reductions. 
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Measuring and Monitoring Carbon Benefits for Forest-Based 
Projects: Experience from Pilot Projects 
Sandra Brown∗  
Introduction 
Many forest-based climate mitigation projects have been developed and are currently 
providing experience in measuring, monitoring, and accounting for carbon benefits. Focusing on 
carbon simplifies the task because the problem is reduced to calculating the net differences 
between carbon stocks with and without the project on the same piece of land over a specified 
time. The challenge is to identify which carbon stocks need to be quantified, measure them 
accurately to a known and often predetermined level of precision, and monitor them over the 
length of the project.  
The initial carbon inventory is distinguished from subsequent monitoring. In the initial 
inventory, the relevant carbon pools are measured; in subsequent monitoring, only selected pools 
may need to be measured, and even indicators can be used, depending upon the type of forestry 
project. For example, for a forest restoration project where the carbon credits are generated from 
growing forests, it would be prudent to monitor the changes in carbon stocks on a regular basis, 
perhaps every five years. However, for a mature forest protection project, routine monitoring 
might involve only remotely sensing that the forest is indeed not being cut, and the carbon pools 
may need monitoring only at much longer intervals.  
Which Carbon Pools to Measure? 
Land use change and forestry (LUCF) projects are generally easier to quantify and 
monitor than national inventories because they have clearly defined boundaries, can be stratified 
relatively easily, and offer a choice of carbon pools to measure (Brown et al. 2000b). Criteria for 
selecting the carbon pools to inventory and monitor are type of project; size of the pool and its 
rate and direction of change; availability of appropriate methods; cost of measurement; and 
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attainable accuracy and precision (MacDicken 1997a, b). The carbon credits from a project for 
all pools measured (pools 1 to n) are as follows: 
= ∑1
n (carbon in pool1 for with-project case ￿ carbon in pool1 for without-project case) 
It is clear that for some pools the difference will be positive. For example, lengthening 
forest cutting cycles (￿rotations￿) or stopping deforestation (with-project) will, on average, leave 
more carbon in trees  than more frequent logging or the conversion of forests to agriculture 
(without-project). For other pools, the difference will be negative. For example, the deadwood 
pool in a reduced-impact logging project will be less than the deadwood pool in a conventional 
logging practice. Basically, a selective or partial accounting system can be used that includes all 
pools expected to decrease (i.e., those pools that are smaller with-project than without-project) 
and choice of pools expected to increase (i.e., those pools that are larger with-project than 
without-project) as a result of the project. Only pools that are measured (or estimated from a 
measured parameter) and monitored are incorporated into the calculation of carbon benefits. 
The major carbon pools in forestry projects are live biomass, dead biomass, soil, and 
wood products (Table 1). How decisions about choosing the pools to measure and monitor may 
be made for different types of LUCF projects is illustrated in Table 1. Carbon in trees should be 
measured for practically all project types, since this is the source of most carbon benefits. 
Measuring the understory is recommended where this is a significant component, as in 
agroforests or open woodlands; dead wood should be measured in all forest-based projects￿and 
must be measured in projects related to stopping or changing harvesting practices. LUCF 
projects have often been criticized because of the difficulty of measuring changes in soil carbon 
pools. However, for most forestry projects, soil need not be measured if no loss of soil carbon 
will result. And in fact, projects aimed at protection of threatened forests, improved management 
of timber harvests, forest restoration, or longer-rotation plantations will not cause soil carbon to 
be lost; rather, they will maintain or increase carbon in soil.  
The decision matrix presented in Table 1 implies that one design does not fit all 
projects￿that measuring and monitoring designs will vary by project type and the available 
resources.  
Techniques for Measuring Carbon in LUCF Projects 
Experience with pilot projects has shown that an initial assessment of the area, including 
collecting as much relevant data as possible, is a time- and cost-efficient activity. Relevant 
information would include a ground-truthed land-cover and land use map of the project area; RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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identification of pressures on the land and its resources; a history of land use in the project area; 
identification of without-project proxy areas for future monitoring; climate (particularly 
temperature and rainfall), soil types, and topography; and socioeconomic activities (e.g., forestry 
and agricultural practices). Such information is useful to delineate relatively homogeneous land-
cover strata (e.g., by forest, soil type, topography, land use, etc.) for designing the inventorying 
and monitoring sampling scheme, improving baseline projections, and developing guidelines for 
leakage avoidance. Preliminary sampling of the identified strata is also recommended to 
determine their variability in carbon stocks￿information that is then used to develop the 
sampling design. 
Techniques and methods for sampling design and for accurately and precisely measuring 
individual carbon pools in forestry projects exist and are based on commonly accepted principles 
of forest inventory, soil sampling, and ecological surveys (Pinard and Putz 1996, 1997; 
MacDicken 1997a, b; Post et al. 1999; Winrock International 1999; Brown et al. 2000a; 
Hamburg 2000). The specialized field of forestry called mensuration develops methods for 
sampling and measuring forest trees￿the component that provides the most carbon benefits in 
most LUCF projects. Foresters have been sampling and measuring forests for merchantable 
volume and tree growth for decades, and their techniques are well developed and accepted. 
Winrock￿s methodology (MacDicken 1997a) incorporates these mensuration techniques for 
inventorying and monitoring LUCF projects for carbon. For inventorying forest carbon, the use 
of fixed-area permanent plots (using a series of nested plots where forests are composed of 
small- to large-diameter classes) and tagging of all trees are recommended; this approach is 
generally considered statistically superior for evaluating changes in forest characteristics, 
including carbon pools. Within these plots, all the carbon pools can be measured or estimated, 
with the exception of wood products. Accepted methods exist for determining the number, size, 
and distribution of permanent plots (i.e., sampling design) for maximizing precision at a given 
cost (MacDicken 1997a). 
To estimate live tree biomass, diameters of all trees are measured and converted to 
biomass and carbon estimates (carbon = 50% of biomass), generally using allometric biomass 
regression equations. Such equations exist for practically all forests of the world; some are 
species-specific and others, particularly in the tropics, are more generic (e.g., Alves et al. 1997; 
Brown 1997; Schroeder et al. 1997). Sampling a sufficient number of trees to represent the size 
and species distribution in a forest to generate local allometric regression equations with high 
precision, particularly in complex tropical forests, is extremely time consuming and costly and 
generally beyond the means of most projects. But experience with generic equations, for both RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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tropical and temperate forests, has shown that measurements of diameter at breast height (dbh), 
as is typical for trees, explains more than 95% of the variation in tree biomass. The advantage of 
using generic equations, stratified by, for example, ecological zones or species group (broadleaf 
or conifer), is that they tend to be based on a large number of trees (Brown 1997) and span a 
wider range of diameters; this increases the accuracy and precision of the equations. It is very 
important that the database for regression equations contain large-diameter trees, as these tend to 
account for more than 30% of the above-ground biomass in mature tropical forests (Brown and 
Lugo 1992; Pinard and Putz 1996). A disadvantage is that the generic equations may not 
accurately reflect the true biomass of the trees in the project. However, field measurements (e.g., 
diameter and height relationships of the large trees) or the harvest of two or three representative 
large trees can be used to check the validity of the generic equations. For plantation projects, 
developing or acquiring local biomass regression equations is less problematic, as much work 
has been done on plantation species (Lugo 1997).  
Dead wood, both lying and standing, is an important carbon pool in forests and should be 
measured in many forestry projects (Table 1). Methods developed for this component have been 
tested in many forest types and generally require no more effort than measuring live trees 
(Harmon and Sexton 1996). Total root biomass is another important carbon pool and can 
represent up to 40% of total biomass (Cairns et al. 1997). However, quantifying this pool can be 
expensive, and no practical standard field techniques yet exist. Instead, recent reviews of the 
literature based on research studies of all examples of the world forests are available for 
estimating root biomass carbon based on above-ground biomass carbon (e.g., Cairns et al. 1997).  
Although soil carbon pools are a source of contention in forestry projects, there are well-
established methods and documentation for their measurement (Post et al. 1999). Measuring 
change in soil carbon over relatively short periods is more problematic, but as shown in Table 1, 
this pool need not be measured in most projects. In cases where changes in soil carbon are 
included, rates of soil oxidation under different land uses are available in the literature (e.g., 
summarized in the land use and forestry sector of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC] Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories; Houghton et al. 1997). 
Promising technologies for measuring carbon both directly and indirectly, in some cases with 
modeling and remote sensing, are on the horizon (Post et al. 1999).  
The long-term effectiveness of carbon storage in wood products depends on the product. 
In projects that reduce output of harvested wood by improving forest management or preventing 
logging (and deforestation if some of the wood cut during deforestation entered the wood 
products market), the change in the wood products pool would be negative because the with-RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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project production is less. This negative change in the wood products pool reduces some of the 
carbon benefits from the project and must be accounted for. In plantation projects, wood that 
goes into long- to medium-term products (e.g., sawtimber for housing, particle board, paper) 
represents additional carbon storage. Several methods exist for accounting for the storage of 
long-lived wood products (Winjum et al. 1998). A recent report by an expert group for the land-
use and forestry sector of the IPCC guidelines describes and evaluates the approaches available 
for estimating carbon emissions or removals for forest harvesting and wood products (Brown et 
al. 1999; Lim et al. 1999). A decision on the methodology to be used in the guidelines is pending 
from the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). 
Techniques for Ongoing Project Monitoring 
Monitoring is the ongoing measurement of carbon pools. Permanent sample plots, as 
often used in the initial carbon inventory, are generally considered the statistically superior and 
cost- and time-efficient means for evaluating changes in forest carbon pools (MacDicken 1997a). 
Methods are well established and tested for determining the number, size, and distribution of 
permanent plots (i.e., the sampling design) at various levels of precision or cost. Moreover, only 
a random selection of the permanent plots may be measured in a monitoring program: Not all the 
initial carbon pools need be measured at every interval in some projects, and if judiciously 
selected, some pools can serve as indicators.  
The frequency and intensity of monitoring depend to a large extent on the nature of the 
project. Projects designed to avoid emissions through arresting deforestation or logging need to 
establish that no trees are removed or clearings made, and that the carbon is remaining constant 
or increasing. In projects designed to sequester carbon by protecting secondary forests or 
establishing new forests, on the other hand, changes in all carbon stocks being claimed need to 
be remeasured periodically. 
Remote sensing technology may be useful for monitoring LUCF projects, though to date 
it has hardly been used. Satellite imagery has been used mostly for producing land use maps of 
project areas and for estimating rates of land use change or deforestation in the project 
formulation phase. However, remote sensing technology clearly has potential for monitoring 
forest protection projects and trends in plantation or agroforestry establishment at the subnational 
to national scales. Monitoring improved forest management or secondary forests, particularly in 
the tropics, is difficult with the current suite of satellites, but future development and launching 
of new satellites may overcome this problem.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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Not all remotely sensed monitoring activities need to use data from satellites. Because 
LUCF projects have well-defined boundaries and are relatively small in area (several thousand to 
hundreds of thousand hectares, ha), remotely sensed data from low-flying airplanes can be used. 
A promising advance in this area couples dual-camera digital videos (wide-angle and zoom) with 
a pulse laser profiler, data recorders, and a differential global positioning system (DGPS) 
mounted on a single-engine plane (Slaymaker 2000; EPRI 2001). This system is able to 
determine crown area, tree height (from the pulse laser), and number of stems per unit area, a 
combination of which has been shown to correlate highly with above-ground forest biomass. 
In some circumstances, models can complement monitoring activities for LUCF projects 
by estimating changes in carbon pools over short periods for which direct measurements fall 
below detectable levels, followed by direct measurements over longer intervals to verify model 
projections (MacDicken 1997a; Post et al. 1999; Vine et al. 1999). Process-based models are 
particularly useful for projecting slow changes in soil carbon pools (Paustian et al. 1997; Post et 
al. 1999). Likewise, process-based models for the vegetation component of secondary forests and 
plantations (e.g., Maclaren 1996; Schlamadinger and Marland 1996) could be used in 
conjunction with direct field measurements. 
Pilot Project Experience 
In this section I discuss two designs for measuring and monitoring carbon benefits and 
show how the initial measurements of carbon pools are used to estimate the carbon benefits for 
two pilot projects.  
The Noel Kempff Climate Action Project, Bolivia 
In 1996, the Government of Bolivia, the Bolivian organization Fundaci￿n Amigos de la 
Naturaleza (FAN), American Electric Power and The Nature Conservancy designed a forest-
based pilot project to allow the expansion of Noel Kempff Mercado National Park. PacifiCorp 
and British Petroleum America (now BP Amoco) joined the project in 1997. The duration of this 
$9.5 million project is 30 years. This is the largest pilot LUCF project to date to be implemented 
in terms of area, funds invested, and projected carbon offsets. Further details of this project are 
given in Brown et al. (2000a). 
Noel Kempff Mercado National Park is in northeastern Bolivia in the Department of 
Santa Cruz. The project area of approximately 634,000 ha is within a 1996 addition to the 
western region of the park (latitude 14.775
oS to 13.485
oS and longitude 61.850
o W to 60.640
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W). The park is bounded on one side by the Bolivia-Brazil border, formed by the Itenez River, 
which drains into the Amazon Basin. For about 15 years before the Noel Kempff Climate Action 
Project began, the forest in the expansion area had been high-graded￿that is, the best trees of 
several commercial species were cut￿by three concessionaires. The forests in the expansion 
area are made up of six strata (from interpretation of Landsat TM satellite data). The elevation of 
the project area is about 200 m or less with gentle to flat topography, with a mean annual rainfall 
of about 1,500 mm and a dry season (< 50 mm/mo) of about two to three months. 
The project obtains carbon benefits from two main activities:  
1. Averted logging 
•  Removal of commercial timber has been halted. 
•  Associated damage to unharvested trees has been eliminated. 
2. Averted conversion of forested lands to agricultural uses 
•  Loss of carbon in forest biomass has been halted. 
•  Loss of carbon from soil because of cultivation has been eliminated. 
Inventory of carbon pools: The project design for inventorying and monitoring carbon 
pools is based on the methodology and protocols in MacDicken (1997a). The carbon inventory 
of the area was based on data collected from a network of 625 permanent plots, located using a 
differential global positioning system. The plots were established across the project area, with 
the number of plots sampled in a given strata based on the variance of an initial sample of plots 
in each strata, the area of the strata, and the desired precision level (–10%) with 95% confidence 
(Table 2). A fixed-area, nested-plot design was used (4 m radius plot for trees with dbh of > 5￿20 
cm, and 14 m radius for trees with dbh > 20 cm), and the following carbon pools were measured 
for each plot: all trees with dbh > 5 cm, understory, fine litter, standing and lying dead wood, and 
soil to 30 cm depth (Table 2). Tree biomass was estimated from a general biomass regression 
equation for moist tropical trees (Brown 1997); the validity of this equation was confirmed with 
the destructive harvest of two large-diameter trees. Biomass regression equations for early-
colonizing tree species and palms were developed by destructive harvesting of a sample of 
individuals of such species. Root biomass was estimated from root-to-shoot ratios given in 
Cairns et al. (1997). 
The total amount of carbon in the project area was about 115 million tons (tC), most of 
which was in above-ground biomass of trees (60%), followed by soil to 30 cm depth (18%), 
roots (12%), and dead wood (7%); the understory and fine litter accounted for about 3% of the RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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total. The 95% confidence interval of the total carbon stock was – 4 %, based on sampling error 
only; regression and measurement error were not included. Inclusion of the error due to 
regression and measurement is likely to increase the total error by no more than double, as the 
sampling error has been shown to be the largest source of total error (up to 80% or more) in 
measuring carbon stocks (Phillips et al. 2000).  
In this pilot project, encompassing several strata of a complex tropical forest, the 
measurement of carbon stocks can be accomplished with a high degree of accuracy and 
precision: The key is to establish the required number of plots to reach the targeted precision 
levels. The cost of measuring the 115 million tons of carbon was less than 1 cent a ton. 
Estimating the carbon benefits: Estimates of the changes in major carbon stocks due to 
logging practices￿if logging had been allowed to continue over the project life￿were 
developed to generate the without-project baseline. The main carbon pools considered are above-
ground tree biomass, dead biomass, and wood products. Data included estimates of how much 
land would be logged and the likely timber extraction rates, plus information on the minimum 
diameter classes of harvested trees and the frequency of reharvesting, The estimates, based on 
analyses developed by an independent team of Bolivian foresters, in some cases using 
information from logging concessionaires￿ management plans, were projected over the life of the 
project. 
To determine the change in carbon stocks from logging activities, measurements are 
made in a nearby proxy forest concession (about 80 km from the western edge of the project 
area) whose forest types closely resemble those in the project area and whose practices are in 
compliance with recently enacted forestry laws. Paired permanent plots (logged and unlogged) 
have been established to measure the amount of dead biomass produced during the felling of a 
tree and associated activities, such as yarding and skidding, as well as the rate of regrowth after 
harvesting and without harvesting. Dead biomass results from the crown of the felled timber tree 
and damage to other trees (which may be broken or uprooted or lose large branches). Total 
production of dead biomass carbon per unit of harvested biomass carbon is determined from 
these plots. Results show that for every 1 tC in a harvested log, 2.95 tC (95% confidence interval 
= 0.3, n = 102) of dead wood are produced (S. Brown, M. Delaney, and R. Vaca, unpublished 
data).  
C benefits from averted logging = ∆ live biomass C + ∆ dead biomass C + ∆ wood product 
C RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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where ∆  is the difference between with- and without-project C stocks. The annual 
benefits are calculated from a carbon accounting model that tracks all the changes in these pools 
from a scenario based on the annual area logged, log extraction rates, and logging damage. The 
approach described here for estimating the carbon benefits is based on ￿change detection￿ 
methods￿that is, measuring the change in carbon stocks directly rather than measuring the 
stocks at two different times and subtracting them. 
∆ live biomass C = (biomass C from logging damage + C in timber extracted) ×  growth 
factor 
To estimate the change in live biomass, one could measure the live biomass in the proxy 
concession before and after an area is logged; the difference would give the change in the live 
biomass C. However, in this approach two large carbon stocks are being subtracted, and although 
the error on each stock might be small, the error on the difference, expressed as a percent, will be 
much larger. To overcome this problem, the change in live biomass is being measured directly. 
The change in live biomass between the with- and without-project cases is a result of the 
extraction of timber and damage of residual trees from the logging activities (the quantity in 
parentheses). The quantity in parentheses, expressed on an area basis, multiplied by the area 
logged per year gives the total change in live biomass without adjustment for logging effects on 
growth of the residual stand (the growth factor in the above expression). It is not clear whether 
harvesting stimulates or reduces regrowth in recently logged areas. The logging of large trees 
and the damage to residual trees may be enough to reduce net biomass growth of the stand per 
unit area for a number of years after logging, rather than stimulate it. For projects that prevent or 
modify logging, this effect of logging on growth of the residual trees must be determined. 
Monitoring of paired permanent plots in logged and unlogged areas of the proxy concession is 
under way to establish the sign and magnitude of the growth factor over the length of the project.  
∆ dead biomass C = (dead biomass from logging damage ×  decomposition factor) 
In projects that prevent or reduce logging, dead wood cannot be ignored because it is a 
long-lived pool that logging increases. Stopping logging has the effect of reducing the dead 
biomass carbon stock, and the dead biomass carbon in the with-project case is therefore less. 
However, the change in the dead biomass pool has to be corrected for decomposition. At present, 
estimates of the decomposition correction factor are taken from the literature (Delaney et al. 
1998), but field measurements are under way for improving this factor. Note that no 
measurement of the existing dead wood pool is needed in this method￿only the amount of dead 
wood produced by logging.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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∆ wood products C = (timber extracted ×  proportion converted to long-lived products) 
When forests in Santa Cruz are logged, some of the wood ends up in long-term storage as 
wood products. Stopping logging does not prevent all the biomass carbon going into the 
atmosphere, and the fraction that ends up in long-term storage must be accounted for. In the Noel 
Kempff project, the proportion of harvested roundwood (i.e., logs and bolts) that goes into long-
term wood products was obtained from literature sources for Brazil (Winjum et al. 1998). The 
project assumed that wood waste generated at each stage of the conversion of timber to products 
(50% was converted to sawdust in the first milling stage) was oxidized in the year of harvest. 
All told, with the project there is more carbon in the live biomass pool and less carbon in 
the dead biomass and wood products pools than in the without-project case. 
Carbon benefits from averted deforestation: The carbon benefits from stopping 
deforestation result from eliminating the loss of carbon in forest biomass and soil. The without-
project baseline for this component was established using projected human demographics in the 
region adjacent to the project area. The two factors affecting conversion of forestland to cropland  
are increasing human populations and the resulting demand for farmland. In constructing the 
deforestation scenario, it was assumed that migration into the area would fuel a continued 
demand for agricultural land, as has been seen in other nearby areas.  
C benefits from averted forest conversion = ∆ total biomass C + ∆ soil C  
Carbon loss from change in biomass is calculated as the product of the projected area 
cleared and the difference between weighted average carbon in forest biomass (sum of trees, 
understory, litter, dead wood, and roots; Table 2) and agriculture crop biomass. Changes in soil 
carbon is estimated as the product of area cleared, weighted average forest soil carbon (Table 2), 
and an average soil oxidation rate for converted tropical forest soils obtained from Detwiler 
(1986). 
Future monitoring: For the averted deforestation component, very little additional 
carbon monitoring is planned because it is expected that carbon in the existing forest will 
increase only slowly. The key component of this activity is to ensure that the forest is not being 
cleared; monitoring efforts will usethe dual-camera videography technology that Winrock is 
developing. 
For the averted logging, monitoring plans call for remeasurement at five-year intervals of 
the paired plots in the nearby proxy concession to determine any delayed mortality and 
differences in carbon accumulation rates between logged and unlogged plots. These data will be RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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used to revise the carbon benefits if necessary. After two remeasurements, an additional set of 
paired plots in another harvested block will be established to determine whether logging 
practices are changing.  
The Guaraqueçaba Climate Action Project, Brazil 
The Guaraque￿aba Climate Action Project in the Atlantic forest in ParanÆ, Brazil, is 
being developed by Central and South West Services (now AEP), The Nature Conservancy, and 
SPVS. The project area is within the Guaraque￿aba Environmental Protection Area, a federal 
reserve of 775,000 ha. Of the 4,500 ha in the existing project area, about 15% is in pasture, 20% 
is in young to very young secondary forests, and 65% is in late secondary forests; all the forests 
have been disturbed or cleared in the past. The project involves purchasing water buffalo 
ranches, protecting all remaining forests, reforesting some of the pastureland with native species, 
allowing the remaining pasture to regenerate naturally, and allowing regrowth in the secondary 
forests over the 40-year project life. 
The carbon benefits of this project result from emissions avoidance (protection from 
deforestation) and carbon sequestration (reforestation and natural regeneration of areas with 
pasture, enrichment plantings, and recovery of successional forests). In the absence of the 
project, it is expected that the lowland areas would continue to be deforested and upland forests 
would continue to be degraded. With the project, lands that were threatened with deforestation 
are being protected and degraded lands reforested.  
Inventory of carbon pools: The approach taken for this project is generally the same as 
that described above for the Noel Kempff project. Using a combination of remote sensing data 
and on-the-ground measurements, the project area has been classified into four forest strata 
(based on disturbance and successional stage) and three nonforest strata (based on the presence 
or absence of shrubs), upon which the carbon benefits from this project will be estimated. The 
initial inventory involved 168 plots, a number based on initial field measurements in each strata 
as described above for the Noel Kempff project. Using the same criteria, the main carbon pools 
included in this project were live trees (to a minimum diameter of 2.5 cm), dead wood, roots, soil 
(to 30 cm depth), and litter and understory in the younger forest strata.  
In the initial inventory, the total carbon pool (excluding soil) in the forest strata is 
estimated to be about 446,000 tC with a precision level of 6% of the mean at 95% confidence 
(Table 3). The overall weighted mean carbon content of forests is 112 tC/ha (Table 3), of which 
78% is in the live, above-ground woody biomass, 13% is in roots, 7% is in dead wood, and about RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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2% is in litter and understory combined (S. Brown and M. Delaney, unpublished data). Litter and 
understory were not measured in the altered mature forest, because these were assumed to be an 
insignificant component and not worth the time and cost to measure (even in the advanced-
medium stratum, litter and understory represented less than 2% of the total vegetation pool). 
Soil carbon (in the top 30 cm) was measured in the two young forest strata only because 
these are the only strata likely to produce measurable changes over the project life, and a 
baseline value needed to be established. The total carbon in the soil of these two strata is 59,377 t 
with a 95% confidence interval of 13% of the mean. Additional plots in these two young strata 
are planned for 2001, to decrease the variation in the vegetation and soil carbon pools.  
Future monitoring: The baseline carbon content of the pasture-shrub strata has been 
estimated. As these areas are restored with native tree species and undergo succession, 
permanent plots will be established and remeasured at five-year intervals over the length of the 
project. The number of plots to be established will be based on the variance of the lowland 
advanced- to medium-successional forests, as this will be the target forest and its variance will 
reflect the variance of the restored forest. 
Because significant carbon benefits are expected from protecting the forests from further 
degradation, the plots established during the initial inventory will be remeasured at five-year 
intervals during the length of the project. These permanent plots have tagged trees and mapped 
dead wood, and therefore the changes in carbon stocks can be measured directly; this will result 
in smaller errors. 
Other Measuring and Monitoring Issues 
Future monitoring tools: Although the above projects call for ongoing monitoring of 
carbon stocks by revisiting the permanent plots, technological advances are likely to produce 
systems that can monitor carbon stocks remotely, after some initial calibration. The dual-camera 
videography system described above is one such advance that is showing high promise for 
accomplishing this task (EPRI 2001). A test of the system in the Noel Kempff project showed 
that using its measures of crown area and tree height for one stratum of trees in 1-ha plots, with 
appropriate regression equations, yielded average carbon stocks well within the 95% confidence 
limit obtained from the field plots (Slaymaker 2000).  
Data quality and archiving: A reliable baseline and measurement and monitoring plans 
for both the initial and the future assessment of carbon-offset projects require steps to control for 
errors in sampling and analysis. Furthermore, the credibility of the estimates of the carbon RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
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sequestered and retained necessitates a quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) plan. This 
plan should include formal procedures to verify the methods to collect field data and the 
techniques to enter and analyze data. A set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for all 
aspects of the field and laboratory activities should be part of the project￿s documents. To ensure 
continuity, it is also important that the same procedures be used during the project life and are 
archived using standards acceptable to all partners involved in the project. Adhering to the 
procedures will ensure project integrity despite changes in personnel, as well as consistent 
information whenever questions arise about any aspect of the project.  
Carbon-offset projects of the type described here are still in their infancy and must stand 
up to the scrutiny of the scientific community as well as outside organizations that will 
ultimately verify the carbon offsets resulting from project activities. The QA/QC plan must be 
part of the project￿s set of documents available for review and inspection. The QA/QC plan and 
SOPs should be updated as necessary when new field equipment or procedures become 
available.  
Because of the relatively long-term nature of these projects, data archiving will be an 
important component of the work. Original field sheets, laboratory analyses, data analyses, 
reports, models, and assumptions should all be maintained in original hard copies as well as in 
electronic media, and everything stored in a dedicated and safe place￿preferably in more than 
one place. Because of the rapid pace at which software and hardware are changing, all data 
should be stored in a form that can be retrieved and migrated to new systems. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
14 
References 
Alves, D.S., J.V. Soares, S. Amaral, E.M.K. Mello, S.A.S. Almeida, O. Fernandes da Silva, and 
A.M. Silveira. 1997. Biomass of Primary and Secondary Vegetation in Rondonia, 
Western Brazilian Amazon. Global Change Biology 3:451￿62. 
Brown, S. 1997. Estimating Biomass and Biomass Change of Tropical Forests: A Primer. FAO 
Forestry Paper 134, Rome. 
Brown, S., M. Burnham, M. Delaney, R. Vaca, M. Powell, and A. Moreno. 2000a. Issues and 
Challenges for Forest-Based Carbon-Offset Projects: A Case Study of the Noel Kempff 
Climate Action Project in Bolivia. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global 
Change 5:99￿121. 
Brown, S., and A.E. Lugo. 1992. Aboveground Biomass Estimates for Tropical Moist Forests of 
the Brazilian Amazon. Interciencia 17:8￿18. 
Brown, S., O. Masera, and J. Sathaye. 2000b. Project-Based Activities. In R. Watson, I. Noble, 
and D. Verardo (eds.), Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry: Special Report to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5, pp. 
283￿338. 
Brown, S., B. Lim, and B. Schlamadinger. 1999. Evaluating Approaches for Estimating Net 
Emissions of Carbon Dioxide from Forest Harvesting and Wood Products. 
IPCC/OECD/IEA Programme on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Paris. 
Cairns, M.A., S. Brown, E.H. Helmer, and G.A. Baumgardner. 1997. Root Biomass Allocation 
in the World￿s Upland Forests. Oecologia 111:1￿11. 
Delaney, M., S. Brown, A.E. Lugo, A. Torres-Lezama, and N. Bello Quintero. 1998. The 
Quantity and Turnover of Dead Wood in Permanent Forest Plots in Six Life Zones of 
Venezuela. Biotropica 30:2￿11. 
Delaney, M., S. Brown, and M. Powell. 2000. 1999 Carbon-Offset Report for the Noel Kempff 
Climate Action Project. Report to The Nature Conservancy, Winrock International, 1621 
N Kent St., Arlington, VA. 
Detwiler, R.P. 1986. Land Use Change and the Global Carbon Cycle: The Role of Tropical Soils. 
Biogeochemistry 2:67￿93. 
EPRI, 2000 RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
15 
Hamburg, S.P. 2000. Simple Rules for Measuring Changes in Ecosystem Carbon in Forestry-
Offset Projects. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 5:25￿37. 
Harmon, M.E., and J. Sexton. 1996. Guidelines for Measurements of Woody Detritus in Forest 
Ecosystems. US LTER Publication No. 20. US LTER Network Office, University of 
Washington, Seattle. 
Houghton, J.T., L.G. Meira Filho, B. Lim, K. Treanton, I. Mamaty, Y. Bonduki, D.J. Griggs, and 
B.A. Callander. 1997. Revised 1996 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories. IPCC/OECD/IEA. 
Lim, B., S. Brown, and B. Schlamadinger. 1999. Carbon Accounting for Forest Harvesting and 
Wood Products: A Review and Evaluation of Possible Approaches. Environmental 
Science and Policy 2:207￿16. 
Lugo, A.E. 1997. Rendimiento y aspectos silviculturales de plantaciones maderas en America 
Latina. Serie Forestal No. 9, Oficina Regional de la FAO para America Latina y el 
Caribe, Santiago. 
MacDicken, K. 1997a. A Guide to Monitoring Carbon Storage in Forestry and Agroforestry 
Projects. Winrock International, 1611 N. Kent St., Suite 600, Arlington, VA 22209. 
MacDicken, K. 1997b. Project Specific Monitoring and Verification: State of the Art and 
Challenges. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 2:27￿38. 
Maclaren, J.P. 1996. Plantation Forestry￿Its Role as a Carbon Sink: Conclusions from 
Calculations Based on New Zealand￿s Planted Forest Estate. In M.J. Apps and D.T. Price 
(eds.), Forest Ecosystems, Forest Management, and the Global Carbon Cycle. Springer 
Verlag, Berlin, pp. 257￿70. 
Paustian, K., E. Levine, W.M. Post, and I.R. Ryzhova. 1997. The Use of Models to Integrate 
Information and Understanding of Soil C at the Regional Scale. Geoderma 79:227￿60. 
Phillips, D.L., S.L. Brown, P.E. Schroeder, and R.A. Birdsey. 2000. Toward Error Analysis of 
Large-Scale Forest Carbon Budgets. Global Ecology and Biogeography 9(4) 
Pinard, M.A. and F.E. Putz. 1996. Retaining Forest Biomass by Reduced Impact Logging 
Damage. Biotropica 28:278￿95. 
Pinard, M., and F. Putz. 1997. Monitoring Carbon Sequestration Benefits Associated with 
Reduced-Impact Logging Project in Malaysia. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for 
Global Change 2:203￿15.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
16 
Post, W.M., R.C. Izaurralde, L.K. Mann, and N. Bliss. 1999. Monitoring and Verification of Soil 
Organic Carbon Sequestration. In N.J. Rosenberg, R.C. Izaurralde, and E.L. Malone 
(eds.), Symposium: Carbon Sequestration in Soils Science, Monitoring and Beyond, 
December 3-5, Batelle Press, Columbus, OH, pp. 41￿66. 
Schlamadinger, B., and G. Marland. 1996: Carbon Implications of Forest Management 
Strategies. In M.J. Apps and D.T. Price (eds.), Forest Ecosystems, Forest Management, 
and the Global Carbon Cycle. Springer Verlag, Berlin, pp. 217￿29. 
Schroeder, P., S. Brown, J. Mo, R. Birdsey, and C. Cieszewski. 1997. Biomass Estimation for 
Temperate Broadleaf Forests of the US Using Inventory Data. Forest Science 43:424￿34. 
Slaymaker, D. 2000. Personal communication with the author.  
Vine, E., J. Sathaye, and W. Makundi. 1999. The Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting, 
Verification, and Certification of Climate Change Forest Projects. LBNL-41877, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA. 
Winjum, J.K., Brown, S., and Schlamadinger, B. 1998: Forest Harvests and Wood Products: 
Sources and Sinks of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide. Forest Science 44:272￿84. 
Winrock International. 1999. Field Tests of Carbon Monitoring Methods in Forestry Projects. 
Forest Carbon Monitoring Program, 1611 N. Kent St., Suite 600, Arlington, VA 22209. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Brown 
17 
Table 1. A decision matrix of main carbon pools for examples of land- use and forestry projects to 
illustrate the selection of pools to quantify and monitor. Y = yes and indicates that the change in this pool is 
likely to be large and should be measured. R = recommended and indicates that the change in the pool could 
be significant but measuring costs to achieve desired levels of precision could be high. N = no and indicates 
that the change is likely small to none and thus it is not necessary to measure this pool. M = maybe and 
indicates that the change in this pool may need to be measured depending upon the forest type and/or 
management intensity of the project. 
 
 
Project type  Carbon pools 
                    Live biomass         Dead biomass    Wood 
 Trees  Herbaceous  Roots  Fine  Coarse  Soil  products 
Avoid emissions            
• Stop deforestation      Y      M      R      M      Y      R      M 
• Reduced impact logging      Y      M      R      M      Y      M      N 
• Improved forest management      Y      M      R      M      Y      M      Y 
Sequester carbon            
• Plantations      Y      N      R      M      M      R      Y 
• Agroforestry      Y      Y      M      N      N      R      M 
• Soil carbon management      N      M      M      M      N      Y      N 
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Table 2. Estimates of carbon stocks in tons of carbon per hectare (tC/ha) in the forests of 
the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project (from Delaney et al. 2000). 
 
 






















   






















226,827 129  0.5  4.1  11.0  2.0  3.6  25.8  26.9  203 
Liana  (131) 95,564  56 0.5 2.3 4.7  3.8  4.0  11.1  39.9  122 
Flood Tall (64)  99,316  132  1.1  3.2  11.3  1.9  3.1  26.4  44.8  224 
Flood Short (35)  49,625  112  0.2  3.0  9.6  2.1  2.9  22.3  55.5  207 
Mixed L. (218)  159,471  90  1.5  4.4  7.7  2.6  4.3  17.9  24.4  152 
Burned  (6)  3,483  57 0.2 1.6 4.9  0.9  4.2  11.4  36.0  116 
               
Weighted  mean  634,286  106.7  0.8 3.6 9.1  2.4  3.7  21.3  33.3  181 
Statistics               
95% CI, % of mean  4.2         
Project total carbon content (tons)    114,852,218         
Confidence interval (minimum)    110,074,406         
Confidence interval (maximum)    119,630,030         
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Table 3. Total carbon content (including trees, roots, understory, dead wood and litter, 
but excluding soils) in the forest strata of the Guaraque￿aba Climate Action Project, Brazil (from 


















n=  69 46 13 12 
Area 763.0  2,269.6  583.9  363.8 
Mean 153.5  113.5  96.5  40.3 
Min  73.6 65.1 41.1  5.7 
Max  398.7 197.4 203.7  73.2 
Variance  2638.6 952.4 2280.7 414.7 
Standard  Deviation  51.4 30.9 47.8 20.4 
Standard  Error  6.2  4.6 13.2 5.9 
C.V.  (%)  34 27 50 51 
      
Mean (t C/ha –95% CI)    111.9 – 6.8   
Total (t C –95% CI)    445,464 – 27,247   
95% CI (% of mean)      6.1     
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Seeing the Forest and Saving the Trees: Tropical Land Use Change 
and Global Climate Policy 
Suzi Kerr* 
Introduction  
Tropical forests are potentially large stores of carbon that can be used to reduce atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG). However, their incorporation in global climate 
change policy is fraught with uncertainty because of the difficulties of designing policies to 
protect and enhance forests in developing countries. This paper tackles the issues of international 
climate and land use policy design. It provides an overview for the contribution to policy design 
of the subsequent articles, which deal in detail with remote sensing, ecology data needs, 
ecological modeling, economic modeling of land use, and the implications of uncertainty.  
Land use and land use change play a significant role in the global carbon cycle and offer 
important potential to mitigate climate change in both industrialized and developing countries. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2000), from 1989 to 1998 
net emissions from land use change, primarily from the tropics, amounted to 1.6 ± 0.8 gigatons 
of carbon (GtC) per year, which is roughly 25% of emissions from the fossil fuel and cement 
sectors (6.3 ± 0.6 GtC/yr). However, these deforestation emissions were offset by a terrestrial 
sink of 2.3 ± 1.3 GtC/yr, resulting in net uptake in the land use, land-use change, and forestry 
sector of 0.7 ± 1.0 GtC/yr.  
IPCC (2000) projects that under business-as-usual, global deforestation is expected to 
lead to emissions of 1 to 2 GtC per year during the first commitment period. More than half of 
this is likely to occur in tropical forests, which make up 1.8 billion of earth’s 4.2 billion hectares
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 (ha) of forests. Some portion of this deforestation and significant emissions could be avoided 
through conservation projects and changes in the underlying factors that drive deforestation. 
Estimates suggest that reforestation could sequester 1.1 to 1.6 GtC per year, with 70% in tropical 
forests. 2 Additional carbon benefits could be realized through forest management activities to 
enhance existing sinks. Undertaking projects in developing countries to prevent deforestation and 
degradation, increase reforestation, and improve forest management could produce important 
greenhouse gas benefits. Environmentally, these benefits are just as valuable as reductions in 
GHG from energy use. The science suggests that it is important to find a way to incorporate 
tropical land use in the global climate mitigation effort.  
Another advantage of including tropical forests in the climate mitigation effort is the 
considerable benefit that some developing countries could realize from programs like the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). This mechanism potentially advances the process of 
sustainable development in those countries and also gives benefits to the poorest countries, 
which may not benefit much from energy sector activities. Enhancing participation of a wider 
group of countries could encourage them, in the longer term, as they become wealthier or the 
agreement develops, to become more heavily involved. In the words of Robert Stavins, it helps 
allow developing countries to “catch the train but not pay for the tickets.”3  
Land-use activities in developing countries may produce GHG benefits at a relatively low 
cost per ton of CO2 reduced, thereby lowering the overall cost to Annex I Parties (industrialized 
nations) of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. They could also provide GHG benefits quite 
quickly. In particular, avoiding deforestation of forests with high carbon stocks could yield large 
short-term gains. Land-use projects require relatively unsophisticated technology, even though 
they may require institutional and political changes to be truly effective in some countries. 
Investments in conservation and reforestation in the tropics could essentially buy time for the 
parties to develop GHG mitigation technologies in other sectors and replace the capital stock in 
Annex I gradually. Allowing emissions reductions to occur as capital is replaced and technology 
advances is much more efficient than trying to achieve it very quickly.  
To effectively incorporate tropical land-use activities in any climate mitigation effort, we 
need to identify environmental additionality in every period and provide land users and 
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regulators in developing countries with incentives that reflect those environmental benefits. 
Figure 1 shows how additional environmental benefit is defined as the difference between actual 
carbon stored and carbon that would have been stored in the baseline. The key principles that we 
apply to assess possible approaches are environmental integrity, economic efficiency, and 
simplicity.  
 
Figure 1. Definition of Additional Emissions Reduction 
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Sequestration of carbon in sinks in developing countries (non-Annex I Parties) needs to 
have the same atmospheric effect as the emissions reductions that it would replace.4 The credits 
given for sink enhancement should depend only on the additional carbon that is removed from 
the atmosphere (or not put in) and when the carbon is removed.  
 
 
                                                 
4 For convenience I use the word “sink” loosely to mean anywhere that carbon is stored temporarily or permanently 
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Why does it matter when GHGs are removed from the atmosphere, given the long 
lifetime of CO2? It is important for credibility (whether the reductions actually occur) and 
efficiency under fixed targets (reductions today are worth more than reductions tomorrow with a 
binding cap today). We cannot borrow in an unrestricted way from banks on the basis of a simple 
promise to repay; nor should we borrow from the environment when our ability to repay is 
highly uncertain. As long as we base other climate regulation on caps on net emissions during a 
specified period (as Kyoto does), net sink emissions should be treated equivalently so that the 
credits created are fungible.  
Economic Efficiency 
Efficiency has two aspects. First, incentives should match environmental benefits. Clean 
Development Mechanism credits or equivalent credits under any post-Kyoto system should be 
given only for activities that produce additional environmental improvements. Since we want as 
many actors as possible to internalize the environmental implications of their actions, we need to 
translate these environmental implications into prices. Cheap credits are not more efficient if 
they don’t have equivalent environmental impacts. Subject to the requirement to maintain 
environmental integrity, the rules should allow as much flexibility as possible to facilitate 
innovation, experimentation, and a wide range of approaches. 
Uncertainty makes the matching of benefits to rewards more complex, but the simplest 
rule is that we should reward efforts based on their expected impact. As long as people cannot RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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manipulate the rules, this will, on average, lead to environmental equivalency with programs that 
involve certain credit. We discuss the issue of uncertainty in more depth below.  
Second, we need to minimize the administrative and transaction costs associated with the 
program. If we can use cheaper ways to certify and monitor projects that maintain environmental 
quality, we should. If we can remove bureaucratic hurdles that are unnecessary for 
environmental integrity, we should. Below, we discuss the trade-off that arises when cost 
effectiveness requires some loss of environmental certainty.  
Simplicity 
First, the people who need to implement climate policies relating to tropical forests are, 
as a rule, not highly technically trained. The rules need to be as simple as possible to reduce the 
gap between the intentions of policymakers and actual implementation. A complex policy may 
appear to address problems but may actually create more because people cannot understand it 
and implement something different from what was intended.  
Second, because these tropical forest policies are part of an international cooperative 
agreement, transparency is critical. People have to be able to observe what others are doing, both 
to build trust and to provide informal mechanisms that assist and pressure people to comply. If 
the rules are complex, it will be difficult to determine whether a project is really in compliance. 
The rules need to be designed to minimize the potential for manipulation and the perception of 
manipulation. 
Sinks and the Clean Development Mechanism  
Many parties have questioned the use of land-use activities for climate change mitigation 
through the CDM. Some of these concerns arise in developed countries, but others are unique to 
the developing world. Considerable work is needed to address these concerns. The benefits from 
land use sequestration vary considerably across countries. This creates political difficulties 
because some countries will receive no direct benefits and hence are not very interested in 
finding ways to overcome these problems.  
In the context of Kyoto, the issue has been made more complex by the unusual way that 
land use has been included for developed, Annex I countries. Because of poor projections of 
business-as-usual GHG changes attributable to land use change, countries have found that simply 
including changes in net sinks in Annex I would provide a significant loosening of expected 
targets. This is particularly true for the U.S. targets. To address this, a number of complex rules RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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have been proposed that would limit the land use counted for compliance to areas where people 
have deliberately enhanced sinks.5 The obvious solution—altering the overall commitments to 
reflect the shift in position—is not available because it would require renegotiating the targets 
and timetables, a process many countries are not willing to risk. This issue does not arise for 
developing countries because baselines are not yet set. Much of the discussion of sinks in Annex 
I countries is not helpful for understanding how to include them in the context of developing 
countries. 
An issue unique to developing countries is the impermanence of GHGs in land use. If 
Annex I faces a series of contiguous commitment periods that take net sinks into account, any 
loss of a sink will be automatically accounted for. For developing countries we need to create 
this compensation mechanism.  
Some developing countries are concerned that hosting land use projects under the CDM 
will threaten their sovereignty over their long-term land-use and sustainable development 
priorities. The international rules need to allow developing countries to maintain control over 
their resources. Assistance may be needed to develop domestic regulatory systems that both 
protect the country’s sovereignty and enhance sustainable development. 
Leakage is also a larger issue in developing countries because small projects are possible 
and not all developing countries will participate. Leakage results when land-use activities are 
simply displaced from the project area to another area, and the project benefits are offset. Any 
land use project that reduces the supply of a valued resource, such as agricultural land or timber, 
without also reducing demand will likely be subject to leakage. A land use reforestation project 
that increases the supply of plantation timber may crowd out other commercial plantations. 
Leakage can occur within countries and across borders (although within Annex I, the only 
leakage of concern is to countries outside Annex I). If developing countries cannot include land-
                                                 
5 Under Article 3.3, Annex I Parties must account for carbon fluxes from land use change activities (afforestation or 
reforestation, and deforestation) that occur after the base year of 1990. The carbon credits or debits are calculated on 
the basis of the change in carbon stocks from these activities between 2008 and 2012. These restrictions impose a 
kind of additionality requirement on the land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) credits claimed under 
Article 3.3. That is, Parties are to claim credits only for activities involving a change in land use after 1990. Under 
Article 3.4, Annex I Parties have the option to expand eligible LULUCF activities to potentially include such 
activities as forest management, cropland and grazing land management, and revegetation. This expansion could 
potentially apply to the first commitment period.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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use projects, leakage from Annex I countries to developing countries will be exacerbated, but 
leakage within and among developing countries would be avoided.  
Because non-Annex I countries do not have binding commitments, the additionality of 
tropical sequestration must be determined by comparing a project’s land-use activities with a 
baseline representing business-as-usual projections for land-use and associated changes in carbon 
stocks. Carbon sinks, sources, and reservoirs are expected to change with economic 
development, and this change should not be penalized or rewarded. The creation of baselines is 
discussed in greater depth below.  
Finally, developing countries are inherently different because they have different levels 
of institutional and commercial capability. For example, it is much harder to reliably monitor 
forest management in a developing country. Defining “forest” simply and monitoring forests by 
remote sensing might therefore be a sensible way to measure land use even though it misses the 
subtlety of different qualities of forested landscapes. Another implication may be allowing some 
countries with limited capability to carry out very small projects. These projects will have little 
global environmental impact but may facilitate learning and provide local benefits as well as 
strengthening the global cooperative agreement.  
International Rules vs. Domestic Rules 
In this paper we address the design of international rules only. How developing countries 
can effectively create programs under those rules is a critical question. Developing countries will 
face significant challenges in implementing policies to take advantage of the international 
opportunities while also protecting their sovereignty and their own environmental interests to 
enhance sustainable development. This design problem needs to be the subject of future research. 
We believe that clarifying the requirements at an international level is a prerequisite for 
productive research on these domestic policies because they must respond to international 
institutional structures. We also believe that despite the importance of domestic sustainable 
development, domestic policies to promote sustainability can be addressed separately and do not 
need to affect international policy.  
Domestic systems can look quite different from the international system. Measurement 
approaches and definitions of “projects” don’t have to be the same at both levels. Individual 
countries can be allowed flexibility in how they implement sinks policy as long as they receive 
certified emissions reductions (CERs, the tradable credits created by the Clean Development 
Mechanism) according to international rules. Developing countries vary enormously in economic RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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condition, land use, political structure, existing regulations, and concerns about sovereignty; their 
approaches to land use and climate policy should also be allowed to vary as long as international 
environmental integrity is maintained.  
For example, a government could give landowners very generous baselines to ensure 
high levels of participation in sink enhancement, even though the international baseline for the 
project that includes this land is not generous. The government would simply be subsidizing the 
project. A second example could be a domestic tax incentive for forestry. To claim international 
credit, the government would use the international measurement rules to work out the net 
additional effect of this policy and claim CDM credits. The value of these credits might offset 
the cost of the tax credits. Third, a large corporation might implement ecofriendly policies in the 
rain forest in an attempt to reduce deforestation over a wide area. These policies could include 
providing seed and technologies for more intensive agriculture, helping farmers gain legal title 
and hence increase tenure security, replanting areas where roads are cut for oil access, and 
protecting particularly sensitive areas. The government could approve the project and allow the 
company, together with local people, to claim CDM credits assessed under the international 
measurement rules.  
Structure of Paper 
This paper considers only part of the issue of land-use and climate change—forests and 
carbon dioxide. Other land uses and gases are important but secondary in overall climate impact. 
We take a long view rather than focus on the specific short-run issues related to the Kyoto 
negotiations, but we offer some pragmatic short-run options as well. Our focus is almost 
exclusively on developing country issues; the relationship to similar issues in Annex I, where 
relevant, is pointed out in footnotes.  
We begin by addressing two issues that are technically solvable in a simple way: 
permanence and temporal risk. We also discuss the effects of this solution on concerns about 
sovereignty. We briefly address the effects of carbon fertilization and show that this should not 
be a concern in the CDM. We then consider the more complex problems of monitoring land use, 
measuring carbon, and predicting baselines. We have no perfect solutions to these problems but 
suggest some ways forward. We discuss ways to think about the trade-off between reducing 
uncertainty and the costs of living with uncertainty. We also consider the benefits of larger 
projects and ultimately national-level projects to effectively incorporate tropical sinks. The 
following section takes a shorter-run perspective and proposes alternative ways to deal with the RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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problems that may threaten the integrity of sinks in the short run and lead to their exclusion from 
international climate mitigation efforts. We consider the sources of risk and different short-run 
approaches to minimize and limit risk. These alternatives aim as much as possible to provide 
short-run environmental integrity and efficiency while also facilitating a transition toward the 
optimal system in the long run.  
Solvable Problems 
Permanence and risk6  
The GHG benefits from land-use change can be lost or reversed over time, unlike the 
GHG benefits from projects in other sectors.7 This difference necessitates a different set of rules 
for CERs from land use activities and CERs from other sectors. 
When choosing among possible rules, we need to consider how they satisfy various 
criteria. First, the rule should ensure that land use credits have the same environmental impact as 
any other CER, assigned amount unit (AAU, Annex I emissions units), or emissions reduction 
unit (ERU, created in Annex I Joint Implementation). These different units are all fungible under 
the cap. The crediting systems should be compared in terms of how they reflect atmospheric 
GHG levels at every point in time. This principle of environmental integrity means that any risk 
from reversibility should be borne by the buyer and/or seller (as determined in the project 
contract), not by the international community. Second, subject to achieving environmental 
integrity, the rule should maintain maximum flexibility in how the credits are created and hence 
achieve maximum economic efficiency in climate mitigation. If two rules are environmentally 
and economically equivalent but one is simpler than the other, the simpler rule would be 
preferred.  
An effective permanence rule should be designed to reflect the following equivalencies:  
                                                 
6 This section draws heavily on Kerr and Leining (2000).  
7 Some people argue that not emitting fossil fuels is simply delaying emissions, on the assumption that all fossil fuel 
stocks will eventually be used. However, even if this were true and the long-run level of exploration and exploitation 
did not fall, the reversal of the reduction would occur extremely slowly through a marginally lower long-run price 
path. In contrast sink emissions can be rapidly reversed.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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•  One ton of permanent sequestration or storage from land use activities is directly 
equivalent to one ton of avoided fossil fuel emissions (e.g., a wind farm).  
•  The release of one ton of emissions from land use activities (e.g., burning forest) is 
directly equivalent to one ton of emissions from fossil fuel. 
Illustration: Wind Farm Project vs. Avoided Deforestation Project 
Consider a land use project that permanently avoids deforestation of one hectare and 
hence reduces atmospheric CO2 by 100 tons. The Annex I Party that acquires those credits can 
then emit 100 tons of CO2 from fossil fuel use. Over time, the project continues to store the 
carbon, thereby maintaining a lower CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. In contrast, the Annex 
I emissions from fossil fuel use are gradually removed from the atmosphere through the global 
carbon cycle, so the project yields a net benefit as long as the carbon storage continues.  
Note that this is identical to the following non-land-use situation:  
A wind farm project in a developing country avoids 100 tons of CO2 emissions. The 
Annex I Party that acquires those credits can then emit 100 tons of CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel use. As time passes, the 100 tons of avoided emissions from the wind farm project are not 
returned to the atmosphere, so the project continues to maintain a lower atmospheric CO2 
concentration. As in the previous case, the 100 tons of Annex I fossil fuel emissions are 
gradually removed from the atmosphere, so the wind farm yields a net benefit.  
The implication is that if the land use project yields permanent benefits, it should be 
treated identically to the wind farm project.  
Some people have argued that the decay of emissions should mean that the amount of 
land use carbon needed to offset a one-time emission would fall over time. If this were true, it 
would also be true of all other emissions reductions. Therefore, all credits would convey not only 
the immediate right to emit an equivalent amount but also the right to continue to emit as the 
initial emissions were removed from the atmosphere. If we do not treat wind farm credits this 
way, then we should not treat land use credits this way, either. In each year of a land use project, 
the project’s level of carbon stocks changes relative to the baseline. Under an optimal system, if 
the difference in carbon stocks between the project and the baseline increased, the CDM would 
reward the project with more CERs. If it decreased, CERs would be retired. If the forest and 
therefore the CERs were temporary, a CER still would have value, just as money borrowed from 
a bank has value. Annex I countries are willing to pay to delay at least part of their need to 
reduce emissions. Under a system where CERs are retired when project benefits are lost or RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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reversed, environmental integrity can be maintained without requiring that CERs be permanent 
or that a forest be protected forever.  
Our first recommendation is for the project’s credited GHG benefits to be verified and 
adjusted (if necessary) at regular intervals.8 These intervals could be equal to or shorter than the 
period over which caps are defined and emissions are assessed, or the “commitment period.” The 
contract between buyer and seller could permit more regular monitoring and hence evaluation 
and adjustment.9 A net increase in carbon stocks relative to the baseline during each crediting 
period would be awarded CERs. These CERs would be identified as specific to the project and 
could be maintained in a registry or used by the buyer to achieve compliance. During each 
crediting period, any net loss of previously credited carbon stocks would require payback of the 
CERs by the buyer.10 If project monitoring stopped for any reason, the buyer would pay back all 
net accrued CERs. As long as no carbon release occurred and monitoring continued, the CERs 
would remain valid. Allowing indefinite projects would require that long-term baselines (or at 
least a clear process for extending a baseline) be defined in advance. This would be needed in 
any case if projects were to be renewed. 
The second recommendation is that the obligation to repay expired CERs should be 
passed on with ownership of the project-specific CERs if the CERs are traded internationally. If 
a CER is surrendered for compliance, the party that surrendered it should ultimately be 
responsible for repayment when the CER expires. Where multiple parties hold CERs from a 
project and not all CERs need to be repaid, the parties should bear proportionate liability to repay 
the CERs.  
Note that here we support buyer liability. This contrasts with our earlier arguments in the 
context of Annex I trading.11 The difference is that the seller party is not in Annex I and so does 
not have binding commitments under the protocol and is less able to be held liable by the 
international community. Because seller liability would be extremely weak in this case, the costs 
                                                 
8 This is equivalent to the stock-change approach discussed in the IPCC report (2000). Very similar conclusions 
have been reached separately by Don Goldberg at the Center for International Environmental Law and Ken Chomitz 
at the World Bank. 
9 The increased monitoring burden may be economically justified for large projects.  
10 In the case where a buyer Party had surrendered the CERs specific to the project for compliance, payback would 
consist of subtracting the equivalent number of credits (CERs or AAUs) from that Party’s registry. If the CERs were 
still in the buyer Party’s registry, payback would consist of the subtraction of those CERs from the registry.  
11 See Kerr (2000).  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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of buyer liability would be outweighed by the benefits. To ensure environmental integrity, the 
ultimate liability at the international level for payback of land use CERs must be held by Annex I 
Parties, who will be legally bound by their protocol commitments and will face penalties for 
noncompliance. For efficiency, risk should be borne by those who can control it (i.e., those 
involved in the project, not the international community), and beyond that, by those who have 
low risk aversion or high ability to absorb shocks (perhaps investors rather than developing 
country partners).12 However, Annex I Parties could still choose how to distribute the burden of 
that liability domestically through specific regulations between the Annex I Parties and their 
legal entities or the specific contracts between buyer and seller. If the buyer is concerned about 
moral hazard on the part of the seller if the seller is not responsible, the contract could make the 
seller responsible under domestic law even though the buyer is internationally liable. Under the 
terms of the contract, the seller might agree to compensate the buyer if the credits are lost.  
The proportionate liability for repaying expired CERs would not be necessary if all CERs 
from a project were ultimately surrendered by one actor or if all the carbon were released at the 
end of the project. With the secondary market and with projects of significant size, the 
involvement of multiple parties and partial losses of CERs will likely occur.  
We recommend that the permanence rule for land use CERs have the following 
characteristics: 
•  As sequestration or avoided release occurs, CERs are generated and can be sold. The 
buyer party adds the CERs to its adjusted assigned amount.  
•  CERs should be verified at least once per commitment period, with mandatory payback 
of CERs by the CER holder during the commitment period when credited carbon stocks 
are lost or monitoring ceases, whichever comes first.  
•  Liability for payback of CERs should be carried with ownership of the specific CER 
when it is traded and shared proportionately among the CER holders when partial 
payback is required.  
                                                 
12 These issues are discussed in Kerr (1998) in the context of risk to the international community from 
noncompliance. In that paper and here I propose putting that risk onto the project organizers. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Sovereignty over Land Use 
The primary concern with sovereignty is that if a land use project is permanent, the 
country cedes permanent control over the use of that land. The issue is identical to concerns 
about other forms of foreign ownership of resources.13 If projects are not required to be 
permanent, a country could agree to conserve an area for five years but every five years would 
have the option of ending the contract and developing the area. There will be no penalty for 
reversing the sequestration—it is not a breach of contract. The country can gain the benefits of 
investment in land-use projects while maintaining control of its resources. If it wants to engage 
in a long-term contract, it can, but it is not required to. Thus, the solution to the permanence 
problem largely addresses the sovereignty problem as well.  
CO2 Fertilization and Other Changes in Carbon Stocks Related to Climate Change 
Itself 
Emissions of carbon and nitrous oxides can actually lead to higher levels of land-use 
sequestration—that is, the pollution itself acts as a fertilizer and creates sequestration. Some 
parties have expressed concern that Annex I parties might be rewarded for their own emissions if 
they are able to claim more land use credits as a result of this sequestration. This is an issue in 
Annex I because the fertilization does not alter the commitment levels against which compliance 
is assessed and was not considered when the commitment levels were initially chosen. This 
should not be a concern in developing countries, however. Land use credits in developing 
countries are given only for the difference between actual sequestration and the baseline. Where 
land use does not change, fertilization affects both actual and baseline sequestration equally, and 
no credits are created. Where land use does change, those who deforest less (or reforest more) 
than the baseline should—and will—be rewarded more because the environmental effect of 
avoiding deforestation is greater than the benefits of sequestration without fertilization. 
Efficiency requires that credits reflect the true additional environmental impact, which includes 
the effect of fertilization. Equity is not an issue here because those who benefit from the credits 
are developing countries that are not historically responsible for the bulk of emissions. 
                                                 
13 Other aspects of the sovereignty issue may relate to foreign investment per se or to issues of bargaining and 
contracting ability.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Harder-to-Solve Problems: Current Knowledge and Limitations 
To maintain environmental integrity, we need to know the net reduction of carbon in the 
atmosphere attributable to the CDM project. This requires reliably measuring actual carbon in 
terrestrial stocks and comparing it with counterfactual carbon levels. Three measurements are 
required: the area in each land use, the carbon stock in each land use, and the area of predicted 
land uses in the counterfactual case. The same measurements of carbon can be used to assess 
total actual and total counterfactual carbon.  
Environmental benefit = ∑ i (actual – counterfactual land use) ×  carbon in land use i 
Monitoring Actual Land Cover 
The first question is what land covers we want to monitor and how to define them. The most 
accurate definition would include all types of vegetation and uses, as well as the way the 
vegetation is managed. Although this would encourage all forms of sequestration as well as 
protect environmental integrity, it is infeasible, especially in developing countries. We need to 
trade off potential bias in aggregate measures of carbon stock, incentives to preserve and 
sequester carbon efficiently, and our ability to monitor.  
The answers to the definitional questions will be different for Annex I Parties because of 
differences in countries’ capabilities. Moreover, the definitions of “forest,” “reforestation,” and 
other terms could compensate for what some see as overgenerous Annex I baselines for land use. 
The CDM lets us consider the appropriate definition purely on the basis of feasibility and 
efficient, full-carbon accounting. 
For carbon sequestration the essential difference is between forest and nonforest, but 
there are also important differences among forests. Young, regenerating forests contain much 
less carbon than mature forests; forests that have been logged or degraded by pests contain much 
less carbon than more pristine forests. Forests also vary greatly by their ecological 
characteristics, but this can be measured in different ways (see section on measuring carbon, 
below).  
Currently, monitoring can be done in two basic ways: ground-based measurement and 
remote sensing. Remote sensing covers large areas and can be externally verified. It is good for 
large projects or large numbers of projects and can relatively easily distinguish mature forests 
from nonforest areas (with the notable exception of dry forests). The quality of interpretation is RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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still very important, especially where forests are highly fragmented. New satellites and 
techniques allow much finer classification of land cover but are currently too expensive, 
available only in a few areas, and require an extremely high level of skill to interpret.  
If remote sensing is chosen for monitoring, several questions need to be answered.14 
What level of canopy cover is classified as forest? Should this be the same across continents? 
Should remote sensing be used to establish the age of regenerating forests? What is the 
appropriate level of resolution? Higher resolution is more accurate but also more expensive. 
Whatever resolution is chosen, it should be the same for the counterfactual baseline prediction 
and the actual forest to ensure consistency, but it could vary across projects and time as we learn 
more and costs fall. 
Other questions arise as well. What images are actually available from which satellites? 
Are cloud-free images available for the regions we are interested in? Will satellites continue to 
provide these data? Reforestation can take many years to be identified; if remote sensing is used, 
reforestation projects may not receive any credit until the trees are tall enough to be recognized, 
at which point they would receive full credit for “forest” unless the history of land use is used to 
identify their age.  
Ground-based reporting is the alternative. This is more intensive but may be more 
accurate for small areas. A domestic program that rewards foresters and farmers directly may 
need this approach. And if a country uses ground-based reporting and the system is sound and 
reliable at the level of each farm, the aggregate measurements based on this will be sound for 
international purposes. The results could be checked with remote sensing, despite the inevitable 
differences between the two approaches.  
A short-term approach would be to define forest as land cover with a certain canopy 
density that is easily distinguished by remote sensing. We could use the land-use history to 
distinguish age where possible. Because this approach will not pick up degradation, we might 
need to use a conservative carbon number and assume an average level of degradation. Small 
projects could be allowed to use ground-based reporting but with estimates that were more 
conservative than those shown by remote sensing. In the long run, a move to remote sensing 
                                                 
14 Arturo Sanchez-Azofeifa, Benoit Rivard, and Armond Joyce are exploring the use of remote sensing for the 
CDM. They are all associated with the National Science Foundation project on land use and carbon sequestration in 
Costa Rica.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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should probably be encouraged because of its low cost for large areas and because it can be 
replicated by outsiders if measurements are challenged.  
Monitoring should probably be required every five years, particularly if the CERs are 
seen as temporary, as discussed above. Project managers could choose to monitor more 
frequently if they wanted to collect higher CERs earlier. Periodic monitoring could lead to small 
amounts of strategic behavior—for example, forest clearing immediately after monitoring—but 
this would be limited.  
Estimation of Carbon and Nitrous Oxides Associated with Different Land Cover 
and Ecological Conditions 
We need measures of carbon in biomass and soils for a range of ecological conditions 
and the land covers we choose to monitor (e.g., forest and nonforest).15 In Annex I countries, a 
combination of remote sensing, on-the-ground measurement, and modeling of carbon dynamics 
is used to produce estimates of carbon fluxes from different land uses. Reasonably good carbon 
models exist in many Annex I countries and have been calibrated to a range of ecological 
conditions using actual data (e.g., CENTURY). However, a large amount of uncertainty still 
exists, particularly for fluxes in biomass and soil carbon on land where management practices 
change without an overall change in land use.  
Uncertainty regarding biomass and soil carbon fluxes is greater in developing countries, 
where ecological knowledge about carbon in natural forests is limited. More is known about 
carbon stocks in commercial forestry because carbon is directly related to the volume of 
commercially valuable timber, but even here, little is known about soil carbon, below-ground 
biomass, understory, and litter. In tropical countries, conditions are extremely heterogeneous, 
and levels of carbon vary dramatically. Relatively little systematic research has been done on 
carbon stocks across a range of ecological conditions. Within our National Science Foundation 
project we are currently sampling more than 100 sites in Costa Rica in six “life zones” to provide 
a consistent dataset that, together with geographic information system (GIS) databases of 
physical conditions, we will use to calibrate CENTURY to Costa Rican conditions. 
                                                 
15 Boone Kauffman, Shuguang Liu, and Flint Hughes are working on this issue in the context of Costa Rica, which 
has ecological conditions representative of about 75% of the tropics. They are all funded through the National 
Science Foundation project on land use and carbon sequestration in Costa Rica.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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At the project level, a developer can relatively easily sample the tree component of 
carbon stock within each project but cannot easily sample other components—roots, leaf litter, 
soil, and small vegetation—that may vary significantly between forest types and can change 
significantly as forest is cleared.  
Our long-run goal is to produce a “carbon map” of the world so that project developers 
do not need to measure on-site carbon. Their reward would be based purely on their location (its 
climate and physical characteristics) and the mapped predictions of carbon in different land 
covers in that location. This would simplify the process and make claims for CERs easily 
verifiable. Data should be continually collected to improve the accuracy of the carbon map and 








     Pasture 
     (million ha.) 
Actual use in 2002  2       3 
 
Step 2:  Translate the actual land use into levels of carbon in the terrestrial 
ecosystem for different land uses and ecological conditions.   
 
  Forest        Pasture  
Carbon per hectare  100 tons       5 tons 
 
These two combine to give the level of actual carbon in sinks each year. 
  
  Forest   Pasture  
Actual use in 2002  2 (million ha.)  3 (million ha.) 
Carbon per hectare  100 tons  5 tons 
Total Carbon  200 million  15 million ton. 
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Counterfactual Baseline Predictions 
A baseline attempts to capture what would have happened if there had been no effort to 
protect or enhance sinks. We do not know what land use would actually have been chosen and 
will never observe it; we are able only to predict it.  
Predictions can be based on a combination of extrapolation of past deforestation or 
reforestation trends and known socioeconomic factors, such as roads, population density, level of 
development (e.g., gross domestic product per capita or urbanization), value of agricultural 
output, value of timber, and agricultural productivity of the land. Accurate prediction is 
extremely difficult, particularly for small areas. In large areas, idiosyncrasies tend to average out. 
The further into the future the prediction, the less accurate it is likely to be.  
Deforestation Baselines 
Figure 2. Baseline Prediction of Carbon Level in Costa Rica with Uncertainty 
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Our baseline prediction of the carbon level in forests for Costa Rica over 50 years from 
1980 (Figure 2, from Kerr et al. 2001c) uses all the factors discussed above. The middle line is 
the best guess; the upper and lower lines indicate a likely range. The actual forest cover in both 
1986 and 1997 lies in the expected range, so changes in carbon levels are probably similarly 
accurate.  
This baseline forecast was constructed using data for the whole of Costa Rica. Details of 
the process for constructing the baseline are given in Appendix 1. It assumes no reforestation. 
Baseline projections are made for 436 districts and then combined into a national forecast. Each 
of the individual district-level projections will be much more uncertain than the national pattern. 
The same approach could be applied to any area where similar data could be found.  
In this model the level of carbon loss flattens out after the early 1990s for three reasons. 
First, within Costa Rica, the highest-quality land had all been cleared by the mid-1980s, so 
clearing additional land for agriculture was unattractive. Remaining land tends to be high in the 
mountains, steeply sloped, or on poor soils. Second, Costa Rica is beginning the transition from 
an agricultural economy to an industrialized country, and increasingly people are working in 
sectors such as computer chip manufacture rather than clearing more land to farm. Third, the 
Costa Rica government (and some private citizens) have been very active in protecting forests 
over the last 20 years. Much of the remaining forest is in national parks or other reserves.  
Reforestation Baselines 
People often assume it is easier to establish a baseline for a reforestation project than for 
a deforestation project. This is unlikely to be true. Over very short periods it may be credible to 
suggest that many areas of land would not otherwise be reforested, but over the long periods that 
we need to consider for climate change, reforestation is hard to predict. As an example, consider 
the history of forest cover in the United States. In the early 1900s the eastern United States was 
almost completely deforested and used for farming. Today it is heavily forested and there is 
almost no agricultural land. This happened not because of deliberate policies but as a natural 
result of economic development. The development of railways and other forms of transportation 
made it possible to ship food cheaply from the Midwest, and east coast farmers who had poor 
soils could not compete.  
Similarly, in Costa Rica in the last decade, reforestation through land abandonment and 
natural regeneration has become significant, particularly in areas of lower agricultural 
productivity. In the tropics as a whole, even in the absence of climate policy, as natural sources RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
21 
of timber are depleted and internal infrastructure improves, allowing logs to be transported 
cheaply, plantation forestry will become more profitable and larger areas will be put into 
plantations.  
Although such changes will likely promote reforestation, they are no easier to predict 
than the processes that drive deforestation. In some ways they are harder to predict because we 
have less experience with reforestation in developing countries. We have tried to analyze 
reforestation in Costa Rica (using similar data as in our deforestation study) but have so far had 
little success in explaining the pattern.  
In the short run, reforestation may affect relatively small areas, but if the experience of 
the United States or New Zealand is repeated in the developing world, large areas of land and 
hence large amounts of carbon may be affected.  
Updating of Baselines 
In general, predictions of land use should cover long periods to provide investor certainty 
and discourage strategic behavior to try to influence future baselines. That said, predictions far 
into the future are inherently very uncertain. Baselines could be updated with care. More 
accurate baselines would improve environmental integrity over time and actually increase 
investor certainty (in contrast to IPCC assertions). Updating the baseline takes out uncontrollable 
changes in underlying conditions and ensures that the rewards for doing the project reflect more 
closely the real effects of the developer’s activities. The developers will not be held responsible 
for things beyond their control. Baselines might be increased or decreased depending on the 
shocks that actually occur. Updating removes some of the risk involved in what is essentially a 
property rights allocation. The stakes are very high because this property is potentially very 
valuable. Establishing an updating process may make all parties happier about creating these 
property rights in the first place.  
As a general rule in updating, factors that the people affected by the baseline can alter 
should not be taken into account. For example, if the baseline covers a country as a whole, a new 
road or a change in policy that encourages agricultural expansion should not lead to a change in 
the baseline level of forecast deforestation even if it does increase deforestation. In particular, 
changes in the observed level of deforestation relative to the baseline should not lead to changes 
in the baseline.  
In contrast, factors that are outside the control of actors could be used to update the 
baseline. For example, Central American countries are strongly affected by the international RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
22 
prices of coffee and beef but have little control over them. A rise in the price of beef will likely 
increase deforestation and could lead to an increase in baseline deforestation. Global or even 
national economic development could be considered a factor that governments do not directly 
control as part of climate policy. Thus, baselines could be tied to gross domestic product (GDP) 
and updated as it changes.16 (See, for example, studies of the relationship between deforestation 
and population in Cropper and Griffiths 1994, and between deforestation and GDP in Kerr et al. 
2001). Increased biomass as a result of CO2 fertilization should also lead to an updating of 
baseline carbon stocks. 
Alternative Approaches to Baselines for Small Areas 
Although knowledge about local institutions and players as well as detailed information 
about local economic conditions might make prediction for a small area more accurate, the 
problem of leakage makes unbiased baseline prediction difficult. It is very difficult to ensure that 
the sum of baselines for small areas will be consistent with an unbiased national prediction. One 
approach to ensuring consistency is offered below in the discussion of small vs. large projects.  
Anthropogenic Change vs. Natural Change 
A well-defined baseline separates natural changes from human-induced change. The only 
activities that are credited above the baseline are human-induced changes that occur because of 
climate-related policies. In the CDM we do not need to define human-induced changes on a 
project-by-project basis.17  
Errors in Baseline Forecasts 
From an international perspective, environmental integrity roughly requires that the 
baselines be right for the average plot of land covered by a project and that no leakage occur 
outside the project. The baseline does not have to be correct for every hectare, however. What is 
                                                 
16 This is similar to the concept of growth baselines. 
17 This is an issue in Annex I because of unhappiness in how the commitments were set for sinks. Some negotiators 
intended the commitments to require a certain level of real emissions reduction from business as usual.. Because 
they underestimated the net sinks in some Annex I countries (particularly the United States), the commitments are 
more generous than intended. The discussions about limiting sink credits to ones that are directly human induced are 
essentially attempts to correct this “mistake.”  
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needed here is methods that avoid bias and are perceived as fair (and produce results comparable 
to results in other sectors if the emissions reductions are supposed to be fungible across sectors). 
Because no prediction method will always be correct, the process may be as important as the 
outcome.  
Table 1 shows several examples that illustrate the environmental and efficiency effects of 
errors in baselines. The first line shows the correct baseline where no CERs are received if no 
carbon is sequestered and every extra unit of sequestration is rewarded with one CER.  
The second line illustrates a case where the baseline predicts more deforestation (less 
reforestation) than would actually have occurred. Without doing anything, this project can claim 
20 CERs—an environmental loss because it does not relate to any sequestration but does allow 
more fossil fuel emissions. If a project is implemented, however, any additional sequestration is 
rewarded with the correct number of additional CERs, so project developers have incentives to 
create projects.  
In the third case the baseline predicts very high levels of forest (little deforestation or lots 
of reforestation). Assuming that the developing country would not be forced to take losses of 
CERs when it achieves less than the baseline, the country does nothing: It neither creates a 
project nor claims CERs, and there is no environmental impact. However, there is an efficiency 
loss: A project developer who manages to sequester 10 extra units of carbon will still not be 
rewarded because the actual forest level will still be below the baseline level, and projects that 
could create real sequestration will therefore not be done. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
24 
 



















100 100  0  10  10  10 
100 80  20  30  10 10 
100 110  0   





No point in 
doing project 
10 0 




100 110  0  40 
Project may 
be worthwhile 




If our concern is to encourage developing countries to use their land in appropriate ways, 
it would be better to err on the side of making the baseline overgenerous and compensating for 
any environmental loss by reducing total AAUs through more stringent Annex I targets. 
Leakage 
Leakage is defined in the IPCC Special Report as “the unanticipated decrease or increase 
of GHG benefits outside of the project’s accounting boundary (the boundary defined for the 
purposes of estimating the project’s net GHG impact) as a result of project activities.” In the 
context of land use projects under the CDM, leakage could occur if the land uses being altered by 
the project are merely displaced to other areas instead of being replaced altogether. Failing to 
account for leakage (i.e., increases in emissions outside of the project area caused by activities 
undertaken by the project) would result in the overestimation of project benefits. Consider the 
example of a project to conserve primary forest that would otherwise be cleared for agriculture. 
If the project does not address the unmet demand for agricultural land, then the population that RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
25 
needs the land will simply clear forests in other areas, and the project benefits will be offset. 
Because leakage can occur at the regional, national, and international levels, it can be very 
difficult to predict or measure.  
The IPCC proposes a range of approaches to reduce or account for leakage. The most 
obvious, and least restrictive of project design, is to increase the project boundaries so that side 
effects occur within the boundary. This is considered below, in the discussion of the merits of 
larger projects. As an alternative, without increasing the size of the project, the area monitored 
could be increased. This would capture leakage into the area surrounding the project but clearly 
increases the risk to the project developers, who become responsible for activities in areas 
outside their control. This option is similar to the option of multiple projects within national or 
regional baseline, discussed below. 
Project design can help reduce the potential for leakage. For example, a developer can 
evaluate the likely impacts of the project on the existing supply of and demand for goods and 
services, and seek to change this supply-demand equation or address it through alternative 
actions (e.g., agricultural intensification or alternative employment nearby). Alternatively, the 
developer could require that funds freed up from harmful activity not be invested elsewhere (e.g., 
logging company investments). 
The developer can attempt to predict where leakage is likely, monitor leakage impacts 
over time (possibly by monitoring indicators of demand for land, such as demand for fuel, 
timber, or agricultural products), and adjust the estimate of project benefits accordingly. Another 
solution is the development of leakage coefficients by project type and region that can be used to 
adjust the estimate of project benefits in a more standardized way (IPCC 2000).  
Finally, the parties could set conservative baselines to account for leakage by, for 
example, restricting project eligibility to those activities that address the demand for land-related 
resources, such as agricultural intensification projects that enable afforestation, reforestation, or 
forest conservation as a cobenefit. Such a project would have less leakage than one that simply 
restricts the supply of agricultural land without addressing demand. 
Long-Term Solutions 
These problems are complex and we will never find perfect solutions. We need to search 
for simple, standardized, externally replicable methodologies that will lead to unbiased outcomes 
even if they do not reward all actions efficiently and accurately. In the short run, land cover 
could be estimated using low-resolution remote sensing with simple classifications. Rather than RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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measure carbon directly on each plot where C sequestration is being rewarded—a very costly 
process—carbon numbers would ideally be based on the climatic and ecological conditions in 
the project area and the land-use history, all of which can be known from GIS databases. 
Baselines could also be derived from a series of historical GIS and other databases that include 
some socioeconomic information. Then baseline forecasts and carbon estimates could be made 
from anywhere in the world and crosschecked by other analysts without the need for site visits.  
Large projects, ultimately at national level, are more likely to lead to unbiased estimates of 
land cover, carbon, and baselines and hence are more likely to support environmental integrity. 
In the long run, these problems will be reduced only by additional research, by learning by 
doing, and by evaluating our efforts at all stages. 
What are the costs of using these simpler measures of land cover, carbon, and baselines? 
What level of accuracy is necessary and desirable? 
Uncertainty and Climate Policy Efficiency: Costs and Benefits from More 
Accurate Measurement and Prediction18 
If simplified forest area and carbon stock estimates were compared with very accurate 
estimates, we would observe forecasting and measurement errors. The land-use baseline 
predictions will also be incorrect relative to true counterfactuals, even though these cannot be 
observed. By definition, we cannot observe what would have happened without the reward if the 
land managers did in fact receive the reward. Thus, when land managers are rewarded for carbon 
sequestration, their rewards will be incorrect by an unobservable amount. These errors in 
baseline predictions and carbon measurement have real social costs, even when we cannot 
observe them. What is the nature of these costs and how do they compare with the benefits of 
low costs and easy auditing of rewards (such as those available if a model like the one we create 
for Costa Rica is used)? 
If rewards are based on incorrect measures and forecasts, the errors create three costs. 
First, the inaccurate rewards will lead to aggregate environmental outcomes that differ from 
those desired. Overstated measurements of sequestration would lead to real increases in 
emissions when the sequestration credits are sold to a developed country. Aggregate net 
emissions would rise. What matters here is the error in aggregate additional sequestration relative 
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to baseline for the whole country (or even the globe). The cost will depend on how far the 
aggregate actual additional sequestration under the inaccurate rewards differs from the aggregate 
credits generated for sale. The global cost of each excess credit could be measured as marginal 
environmental damage minus avoided marginal abatement cost. Producing too many credits is 
likely to be perceived as a greater cost than producing too few, though if global targets were 
chosen efficiently, both would be concerns.  
Second, land managers would have inappropriate and hence inefficient incentives to 
sequester carbon. The cost of the sequestration that did occur would be higher than necessary. 
Some managers will sequester too much, and others, too little. Our model can estimate these 
costs in dollar terms. Third, land managers who sequester equal amounts of carbon will be 
rewarded differently, creating equity concerns. This could affect the acceptability of the system. 
Unacceptability is not measurable, but the marginal costs will increase with the size of errors, 
whether positive or negative. Both of these costs depend on errors in plot level rewards. 
Efficiency costs simply depend on errors relative to reality. Equity costs depend on how 
forecasts vary across plots that are really identical. Even if the forecasts correctly credit 
aggregate sequestration, inefficiency and inequity could be problems. 
Costs of Reducing Uncertainty 
The gains from reduced uncertainty need to be contrasted with the qualitative values of 
greater simplicity, which translates to lower costs of participation in trading and lower potential 
corruption through greater transparency and verifiability in the application of crediting rules. 
A first obvious cost of increasing accuracy is an increase in direct costs of the analyses (in 
pilot sequestration projects, generating acceptable C measures has been a significant cost). In 
developing countries with low capacity, the skilled people needed to do high-quality remote 
sensing, baseline development, or carbon measurement may be unavailable or better employed 
elsewhere. Second, both direct costs and uncertainty about the outcome of the certification 
process will discourage potentially valuable projects. Fewer C trades will take place, so some 
gains from trade will be lost.  
The third cost of using more data and more complex computations is an increased scope 
for manipulation. Complex rules may become nontransparent black boxes. This makes decisions 
ambiguous and difficult to challenge. Unlike the pilot phase of activities implemented jointly, the 
CDM would involve real financial gain. Project developers and managers would have a financial 
incentive to bias their estimates in their own favor, and these biases may be difficult for outsiders RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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to identify or challenge. If the analysis uses specific local information, outsiders cannot replicate 
and check it without a large cost. Because more complex rules involve more costly data 
collection, third-party monitoring to check the claims by CER producers may be reduced. 
Ironically, then, increased effort and complexity to reduce some errors may in fact lead to others. 
Clearly, if it costs nothing to increase certainty, we should. However, attempts to reduce 
uncertainty could actually increase it—and also disproportionately reduce the possible benefits 
from sinks.  
Costs and Benefits of Small and Large Projects  
To date, most land use projects have been relatively small compared with the nations that 
submit them. To realize the full potential of sinks, we probably need to move toward more 
comprehensive projects that cover large areas. The scale of the climate problem is large, and 
numerous small projects, each with a high fixed cost for organizing, monitoring, and so forth, are 
probably unwieldy. Although larger projects have large organizational costs, there are almost 
certainly economies of scale.  
National or regional projects can assume a wide range of forms and look quite different 
from most of the current projects. Including a very wide area allows rewards for policy efforts 
whose effects are diffuse but important when summed over large areas. National efforts can 
include not only familiar projects, such as those to create or protect national parks, but also 
policies that may not even be recognized as climate policies: reducing subsidies for pasture, 
improving security of tenure, facilitating the diffusion of technology and access to capital that 
allow intensive agriculture, tax incentives for commercial forestry, strategic location of roads, 
population control, and industrial development that will draw forest users into other employment. 
These policies are not easily rewarded in the context of projects that cover small areas but may 
be the most important in the long run.  
In this section we first explore the advantages of large projects, as well as the benefits 
from small projects. Then we discuss ways that some benefits of small projects could be realized 
while gaining the international benefits from national baselines and monitoring. Finally, we 
discuss the effects that large projects might have on the negotiating process itself. 
Advantages of Large Projects   
1.  Averaging out heterogeneity and idiosyncrasy over large areas RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Most processes for prediction of baselines, remote sensing of forests, and estimation of 
carbon stocks in an ecosystem will make random errors on each individual site because people 
and ecological systems are heterogeneous. For example, for reasons that we cannot easily 
observe, some people clear poor-quality land that we would not expect to be cleared, while 
others preserve forest cover on high-quality land. Some land happens to have unusual soil 
characteristics and can store much more or much less carbon than the average site with the same 
rainfall and temperature. Remote sensing at low resolution cannot observe small cleared areas or 
pieces of forest, but with an appropriate rule for interpreting the data, the gaps and fragments that 
are missed should balance each other out.  
Careful statistical work can make sure that the processes are not biased over large samples 
and that these errors will average out to give very precise estimates over large areas. In small 
areas these errors cannot be avoided without enormous effort, and estimates generated using the 
same methods will tend to be inaccurate.  
2.  Preventing environmental bias because of project selection 
Suppose there are two areas in a country. The same baseline approach—one that 
generates unbiased accurate national baselines—is used for both. It creates a favorable baseline 
for one area (low level of forest expected) and an unfavorable baseline for the other simply 
because of errors in the baseline process that average out at the national level. If a project 
developer can observe factors that are not included in the baseline calculation and hence knows 
that the baselines are incorrect, she will choose to do a project in the area with the favorable 
baseline. She will gain credits not only for the real sequestration the project achieves but also for 
the difference between the calculated baseline and the true baseline.  
If only that one area is used for a project, environmental integrity will be lost. If one 
larger project covered both areas, however, the favorable baseline in one area would be offset by 
the unfavorable one in the other, and environmental integrity would be ensured. 
3.  Reducing problems with leakage 
Leakage is likely to be less of a problem with large projects because it can occur only 
outside the project. As more areas are included in a project, more side effects are automatically 
included in the project monitoring.  
 
 
 RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
30 
Figure 3. Leakage and Project Size 
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Figure 3 shows some leakage implications of different sizes of project. The dark line 
indicates the regional or national boundary across which leakage is likely to be reduced. The first 
example has potential for a lot of leakage, which must be built into its baseline and the scope of 
the area monitored (see discussion below of ways to address leakage in small projects). The 
second example has no major leakage outside the project area (all leakage is into other countries 
or regions) because one project or the other is responsible for all carbon outcomes. This could 
require some coordination among projects if one project precedes another. If leakage is taken 
into account in the first project, it will reduce the obligations of the second project or lead to net 
environmental overcompliance. The third example is the simplest case: leakage occurs only 
outside the region. 
In any case we need to define the project boundaries carefully so that most of the side 
effects are contained within the project and do not just cross the border. Leakage probably 
decreases with distance. Ideally, land uses outside the project border will be relatively unaffected 
by the project. If the project has little effect, leakage will also be small. For example, because 
deforestation often increases near roads, using a road for the boundary will simply shift 
deforestation to the other side of the road, creating significant leakage. Leakage across a national 
border is likely to be weaker than leakage within a country because of market barriers and 
reduced labor mobility across frontiers.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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4.  Costs of organizing and monitoring projects 
Every project, regardless of size, requires the same basic components. The costs per 
hectare of monitoring forest, estimating carbon levels, and predicting baselines all diminish as 
project size increases. Large projects cost the international community less but provide the same 
amount of additional sequestration.  
Advantages of Smaller Projects 
1.  Potentially higher accuracy 
With small projects a very different approach can be taken to monitoring, estimating, and 
predicting. Measurements for a small project could involve much more specific information and 
hence could be more accurate on a hectare-by-hectare basis. This could provide more efficient 
incentives to land users.  
2. Potentially  fewer  errors 
As discussed above, the costs of errors probably increase with the total amount of errors. 
For example, the damage from small levels of inequity or manipulation is probably small but 
may grow rapidly with the size of gains by particular groups until it is perceived as unacceptable. 
Similarly, small deviations in aggregate environmental benefit are insignificant, but large 
deviations may reduce confidence in the agreement as a whole. If each CER is systematically 
biased to produce less true sequestration than is credited, a project that creates a large number of 
CERs will lead to a large bias.  
Small projects produce fewer CERs, so even if they are more risky per ton, the total risk 
is lower. Furthermore, no one associated with a small project can make a very large illicit gain.  
3.  Lower total cost of organization and monitoring 
Greater total resources are needed for setting up a large project even if the average cost 
per unit of sequestration is small. If the project is experimental and must be subsidized, it is 
much cheaper to subsidize if it is small. If the project is profitable, the relevant cost is the 
average cost of organization and monitoring. 
4.  Relative ease of coordinating  
In the short run, small projects may be essential if we want the least-developed countries 
to participate. Such nations face an acute shortage of the entrepreneurial and managerial 
capability necessary to design and implement large, sound projects at the national level. Large RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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projects would therefore need to be organized through governments, which are sometimes 
unstable and always focused on more pressing issues. In contrast, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) or foreign companies, with the support of local communities, could 
facilitate small projects.  
5.  Independence from government  
Another advantage of small projects is that they require only the host country’s approval, 
not its active participation. When NGOs and companies or subnational domestic organizations in 
communities or states organize the projects, the potential problems of government-level 
corruption are reduced. In contrast, national-level programs almost inevitably involve 
government in a significant role. 
6.  Equitable distribution of side benefits from participation 
Often, those who do projects with foreign investors receive nonmonetary benefits, such 
as technology transfer, foreign exchange, and access to additional capital. In less-developed 
countries these benefits can be hard to access directly. If the least-developed countries cannot 
organize large projects, they therefore may not realize these side benefits. Thus, rules that ensure 
that every country can have at least some projects would be equitable.  
Making small projects more feasible is one approach. This is part of the rationale behind 
the Pronk proposal to give preferential treatment to small projects. However, this will advantage 
all small projects, not simply those in countries that would otherwise have difficulty 
participating. Alternatively, if the goal is to help less-developed countries and those who have no 
experience with projects participate in the CDM, these groups could be targeted directly with 
international programs to help them build capacity to create projects.  
Part of the motivation for the concern about equity is the expectation that CDM will be 
somehow capped in total. Under a cap on total CERs (or those from sinks), it might be expected 
that the largest, most efficient projects would be done and the small, least efficient projects 
would not compete. This would not be a concern if small projects were efficient. If there is no 
cap, any project where the costs are lower than the value of the CERs created will be feasible and 
will find a buyer. We discuss below the reasons for and against a temporary cap on CERs from 
sinks.  
7. Learning 
Probably the most important argument for allowing small projects, despite the risk they 
create, is the contribution they can make to learning—by the project developers, the host RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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government, and the international community. Because total risks and total organization costs are 
lower for small projects, we could afford to experiment with a range of project designs at little 
cost.  
Individual Projects within a Nationally or Regionally Consistent Baseline and Monitoring 
System 
An alternative approach that allows subnational projects while gaining the international 
advantages of national or regional projects would be to establish “national” baselines and 
monitor on a national level but have the national project broken in several projects that are 
jointly consistent with the national monitoring but can be considered separately for compliance.  
The same methodology would be used to create baselines for the project area and the 
nation or region. Monitoring of land use and estimation of carbon changes would be done at a 
national or regional level. For assigning credits, the international rules would assume that all the 
area outside the project is at baseline level and hence allocate all CERs generated in the nation or 
region as a whole to the project. Two or more projects would have to have a prior agreement on 
how to share credits. A logical approach might be to assign all the area outside the projects to 
specific projects, as illustrated in Figure 4.  
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Effects of Regional or National Baselines on Future Commitments 
Creating regional or national baselines has some clear advantages for reducing leakage 
and reducing the uncertainty in land use projects. Some developing countries have expressed 
concern, however, that creating such baselines would disadvantage them in future negotiations.  
At the same time there are high international costs from the uncertainty about how the 
developing countries’ commitments will be established in the future. As long as the basis for 
future commitments is not clear, it will be difficult for developing countries to create appropriate 
policies to address growth in their greenhouse gas emissions. Developing countries have strong 
incentives to behave strategically because their current actions are likely to affect their future 
obligations. Ideally, all countries—both developing nations and Annex I Parties—would now 
begin to behave as though they face a price for the use of carbon. They would consider the global 
implications in every decision about land use. Taking on a regional or national baseline would 
facilitate this because the CDM would reward all efforts to sequester additional carbon.  
If, however, developing countries believe that future emissions targets will depend on 
future emissions levels, they would have incentive to increase their rate of deforestation or defer 
reforestation and resist regional or national baselines—and in fact, the CDM as a whole.. This is 
the opposite of what is ideal. Developing countries may also resist regional and national 
baselines if they want to avoid commitments altogether. Baseline estimates would provide an 
obvious focus on which to base commitments. If baselines have been calculated and accepted by 
the developing country, it will be harder to delay commitments by stretching out the negotiation 
over levels of commitment. 
Will future commitments depend on future emissions? Will doing CDM projects on a 
large scale affect future bargaining? Unfortunately, they may: In Annex I, emissions were clearly 
the basis for negotiations, and although 1990 emissions were used as the standard, the 
differentiation around that depended in part on the growth in emissions between 1990 and Kyoto 
in 1997. Changes in emissions since Kyoto have led to attempts to alter commitments.  
Essentially, negotiations tend toward finding outcomes that impose similar costs on 
similar people. If a country carries out a lot of CDM projects and has an efficient system with a 
regional or national baseline between now and 2012, it will be able to control emissions at lower 
cost after 2012. In contrast, a comparable country that does not do anything about climate change 
will face much higher costs of achieving similar emissions levels after 2012. The country that 
engaged in CDM and took on regional or national baselines will tend to face higher 
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Can Adverse Effects Be Prevented?  
The adverse effects could be prevented by a clear agreement that future commitments 
will not be based on future emissions and hence will not penalize developing countries that act 
early. For example, language in the agreement could state that future commitments will not be 
based in any way on levels of actual emissions after 2000. Commitments could still depend on 
factors that influence emissions, such as economic growth or population growth.  
Straw-Man Proposal for Incorporating Tropical Forests in Climate Mitigation 
Efforts 
Land use CERs should be credited as sequestration occurs and tracked so that if the 
sequestration is reversed in the future, they (or equivalent AAUs) expire. This solves the 
problems of deliberate or accidental loss of sequestration as well as providing sovereign control 
over the long-term use of land in developing countries. 
To avoid concern that current efforts to control emissions will backfire on countries, 
leading them to face more stringent pressures in the future, we can explicitly state that 
commitments for developing countries will not be determined on the basis of any measure of 
emissions or sequestration after 2000. 
On the more difficult issues of monitoring land cover, measuring carbon, and predicting 
baselines we propose one possible solution as a starting point for discussion. The details are 
incomplete but we believe the overall structure is appropriate. 
We propose two sets of rules. The first is for national or regional projects, where 
estimates will tend to be more accurate because the projects are wide in scope and do not have 
problems with strategic selection of project locations or with leakage. The second is for small 
projects, recognizing that at least in the short run there are reasons why national or regional 
projects will be impractical and inappropriate for some actors and some countries.  
Proposed National or Regional Project Rules  
Monitoring Land Cover 
•  Monitor only forest versus nonforest.  
•  Distinguish forest from nonforest with a fixed canopy cover rule (e.g., 50%), for 
reliability and consistency of remote sensing. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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•  Set resolution of remote sensing to a given level (e.g., 3 ha or 1 km) with a “majority 
rule” to account for forest fragmentation.  
•  For reforestation, monitor the age of the forest (using historical remote sensing data) as 
well as the canopy cover. Reforestation projects would not receive credit until they 
passed the canopy cover level.  
Refinements could allow more levels of forest (different levels of canopy cover) and 
choices about the level of resolution. Higher resolution would necessitate different majority rules 
to maintain average forest cover estimates for the same forest.  
Measuring Carbon 
•  Use temperature and precipitation (or other readily observable factors) to identify 
different zones in each country.  
•  Estimate the average carbon per hectare for forest with more than the required canopy 
cover in each zone globally. 
•  Estimate nonforest carbon per hectare for each zone (if it varies significantly; otherwise 
use one number). 
•  Set the carbon number for nonforest areas at the high end of the likely range. 
•  For deforestation, set the carbon number for forest at the low end of the range.  
•  For reforestation, credit only the increase in carbon in above-ground biomass. Use the 
lower end of estimates of annual sequestration rates. 
Refinements could allow nation-specific carbon numbers to account for factors other than 




•  Calculate past deforestation rates by the temperature-precipitation zone. 
•  For least-developed countries, assume that this rate continues within each zone. 
•  Decrease this rate by a proportion for higher-income countries. For example, the rate for 
countries with per capita annual income above US$3,000 would be reduced by 20%, and 
above US$6,000, by 50%. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Reforestation Baselines 
•  Assume a positive percentage of cleared agricultural land (this could be further refined to 
cover land not used for permanent crops).  
•  Increase this percentage as per capita GDP rises. 
Proposed Rules for Small Projects 
Monitoring Land Cover 
•  Use the same canopy rules as for national and regional projects. 
•  Allow ground-based monitoring as an alternative. 
•  Use higher-resolution remote sensing. 
Measuring Carbon 
•  Use the same rules as for national and regional projects but discount the difference 
between forest and nonforest to account for problems of strategic site selection. 
•  Allow local measurements as an alternative but discount them if the measurements are 
not easily replicated. 
Predicting Baselines 
Deforestation:  
•  Use local historical deforestation rate for the temperature-precipitation zone but discount 
it to account for strategic site selection.  
Reforestation Baselines:  
•  Use the same assumptions as for national and regional projects but discount them to 
account for strategic site selection.  
Leakage 
•  Either discount all CERs (by a decreasing amount as project size increases); or 
•  require active antileakage policies; or  
•  create baselines and monitor forest cover on an area larger than the project and reduce 
credits by the measured leakage outside.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Short-Run Solutions to Risk 
The environmental integrity risks associated with including land use activities in CDM 
are real and significant. They arise from problems with monitoring land cover and leakage, with 
measuring and estimating carbon stocks on land, and with predicting baselines. These risks will 
probably decrease over time with improved knowledge, but in the short run, if we want to 
include these activities, we need to think about ways to reduce the risk.  
We are concerned about risk for two basic reasons. First, the environmental integrity of 
the agreement as a whole may be endangered such that global emissions do not fall as far as 
planned. There is a concern that land use projects would be systematically biased toward 
providing more CERs than they really sequester additional carbon. Second, even if the aggregate 
effect on environmental integrity is small, inequity could be a concern. Large differences in the 
CERs given to projects that in reality have similar environmental impacts will create concern 
among those who feel they are disadvantaged. If these differences were caused by deliberate 
manipulation by those who gained more CERs, the sense of unfairness would be exacerbated. If 
the concerns were only about real changes in environmental outcomes, the risks would have to 
be quite large before they had a global impact, but because they involve perceptions of lack of 
integrity or inequity, even small risks may have large impacts.  
The disadvantage of policies to reduce risk is losing real opportunities for environmental 
and economic gain, as well as the collateral benefits of CDM projects, such as technology 
transfer and capital access. Opportunities for learning, and hence long-term risk reduction may 
be lost as well. If policies to reduce risk were implemented, it would be important to ensure that 
these disadvantages do not affect some groups disproportionately. Different countries should 
have similar opportunities to benefit from the CDM and to make the investments that will allow 
them to participate fully in the longer term.  
Thus, the challenge is to reduce risk and the perception of risk while, as far as possible, 
maintaining some benefits from sinks and encouraging learning that will facilitate a transition to 
the optimal system in the long run. 
Delay Inclusion of Sinks 
One extreme response to the risks involved in CDM projects is to simply delay the 
inclusion of sinks in the CDM until a later conference of the parties. This avoids the risk of 
creating bad precedents with bad rules that are hard to change. It also eliminates any interim 
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credits, delaying the decision until a later conference would effectively remove any gains from 
these projects even if land use activities become eligible by the time of the first commitment 
period. Investors are unlikely to develop significant projects until the rules are clear. Learning 
could still occur through research and through pilot projects that may not be credited, but it 
would be limited to the type of learning that occurred under the pilot phase of activities 
implemented jointly.  
Limit Risk 
A risk-reducing strategy should trade off reductions in risk against the lost real 
sequestration and loss of opportunities to learn. Before deciding how to limit land use projects 
under the CDM to reduce risk, we need to consider where the risks come from and where they 
are likely to be higher and lower. We should aim not only to reduce total risk but also to reduce 
average risk per ton of carbon benefit. If average risk falls, we can gain more benefits for the 
same level of total risk. 
The risk can be thought of in terms of risk per ton of CERs claimed and the number of 
total tons potentially involved. The risk per ton depends on the accuracy of land cover 
monitoring, the accuracy of carbon measurements, and the accuracy of the baseline. The number 
of tons depends on the cost of avoiding deforestation and encouraging reforestation over large 
areas. It could depend on such factors as the area of forest, the value of additional agricultural 
land or timber (and hence the level of threat to the forest), the ease with which the threat can be 
avoided, and the area that might be available for reforestation and the cost of reforestation. A 
large risk that affects a small number of tons of CERs may not be that important.  
Total risk = risk per ton ×  number of tons 
Different types of projects will have different risks per ton of credit created. Conservation 
projects tend to lead to more total risk simply because large amounts of avoided release are 
involved. Mature forests contain much more carbon than growing forests (ten times or more in 
the early years of reforestation). In addition, the areas of existing forest that are threatened and 
hence could be conserved are much larger than the areas likely to be reforested in the short run. 
Thus, even small risks per ton in conservation projects blow up into large total risks. At the same 
time, the large amounts of avoided release also mean that the potential benefits from 
conservation projects are very high.  
It is not necessarily true, however, that conservation projects face more risk per ton of 
credit created. It is arguably easier to predict baselines for deforestation than for reforestation RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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(see earlier discussion). Levels of carbon in tropical mature forests are better understood than 
levels in forests that are growing (except for plantation tree crops, which have been well 
studied). The extent of mature forest is also easier to monitor by remote sensing.  
Large projects may face less risk per ton of carbon than small ones because many of the 
uncertainties in measurement and prediction average out over large areas. Large projects also 
avoid concerns that project developers have strategically chosen sites that have favorable 
baselines. Larger projects face fewer problems with leakage. Projects that create large amounts 
of credit per hectare could probably create at least a small amount of credit per hectare with very 
little risk. However, the total scale magnifies any risks on a large project.  
Average risks do not necessarily increase as a particular country produces more CERs (or 
decrease as the number of CERs declines) because there is no reason why less risky projects 
would be done first. Concerns about inequity, however, could be a function of the amount of risk 
created by each country. If all countries impose similar risks and receive similar benefits, the 
concerns may not be so great as if some countries benefit disproportionately from biases in the 
CDM system.  
Two basic strategies could be used to control risk—indirectly, by capping risk per ton, 
and directly, by capping total credits. These could also be used in combination.  
Indirect Limits on Risk 
The first possible approach is to reduce the risk on every CER created. This approach 
would not limit total risk directly but, by lowering the risk on every ton and reducing the number 
of profitable projects, would reduce total risk as well. This could be done in two ways: 
conservative rules for CER creation and exclusion of risky activities.  
Conservative Rules for CERs 
Making the rules for monitoring, measurement, and prediction extremely conservative 
would ensure that on average, fewer CERs are created than additional sequestration is achieved. 
That is, conservative rules create a positive environmental bias. 
Within the proposed policy rules discussed in section 3.5 are a number of opportunities to 
systematically create fewer CERs for every unit of sequestration. For example, nonforest carbon 
numbers can be set high and forest carbon numbers low relative to the range of international 
estimates. The rules might allow only a fraction of past deforestation rates as the baseline 
deforestation rate. For example, a country with 2% annual deforestation over the past decade RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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might be allowed to claim only 0.5% deforestation as a baseline for the next decade. Small 
projects could have their credits highly discounted to reflect their higher average risk.  
Imposing these types of restrictions would probably result in the loss of some good 
projects, but most projects lost should be marginal ones, which are probably also more risky. The 
restrictions would lower (or conceivably even remove) the average risk per project as well as 
reduce the total number of profitable projects—both of which will reduce total risk. Conservative 
rules will not, however, completely block any particular country or any project that could have 
potential. They will facilitate learning while controlling risk. If the rules were based on what we 
think optimal rules will look like, they can gradually be made less conservative as information 
improves and risk diminishes. 
Exclusion of Some Activities 
Some parties have proposed excluding activities that are perceived as having a higher 
risk. For example, several proposals (including the Pronk Presidency Paper, April 9, 2001) 
would make natural forest conservation (or regeneration) ineligible for CDM projects. What 
would be the implications for the environment? First, as discussed above, it is not clear that this 
would lower average risk. Conservation projects may actually have a lower risk per ton of carbon 
sequestered. It is clear that such a policy would reduce total risk because a large amount of 
potential carbon sequestration (and hence a lot of aggregate risk) relates to avoided deforestation.  
Excluding conservation projects could, however, have some unfavorable side effects. If 
actors can cut natural forest, replace it with plantations, and receive a reward for the plantations, 
the level of carbon in the atmosphere will rise. This would be hard to avoid in the long run 
because land use baselines have not been set in developing countries. In terms of efficiency, not 
including natural forests would miss a major opportunity to sequester carbon. Natural forests in 
the tropics contain very high levels of carbon that are lost almost immediately when they are 
cleared. In contrast, carbon is sequestered relatively slowly in new forests, particularly when the 
land has been cleared for a long period and the soil has consequently been degraded. Other 
implications of excluding natural forests would be the loss of opportunities to gain cobenefits, 
such as conserving biodiversity, maintaining the cultures of indigenous peoples, protecting 
watersheds, and preventing floods. Any policy that excludes some types of projects would limit 
total risk but would not necessarily lower average risk, and it would not facilitate learning about 
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Direct Limits on Total Sink Credits 
The simplest approach to limiting total risk while allowing some CDM land use activity 
is to limit the total number of land use CERs. This would put an upper bound on total risk at the 
maximum risk per ton ×  the CER cap. Because land use CERs can be temporary, any limit 
should be on the land use credits created net of land use credits that have expired during the 
commitment period. 
A cap makes CERs scarce and valuable. A key question is who will get to create the 
limited number of profitable CERs and what quality those CERs will be. The worst possible 
thing that could happen under a cap is that, because the least environmentally sound projects are 
the cheapest to create, they will be the first—and only—projects. Each of these CERs will 
generate profit. Once a CER has been created, it is “gold plated” and will sell at the international 
price even though it may have cost little to produce. Buyers do not benefit from credits’ being 
created more cheaply—only the sellers (creators) do.  
Any fixed cap requires some type of rationing system. This could be done in four ways: 
•  A process-based rationing system controlled by the CDM executive board. 
•  A previously agreed-upon cap on each seller country.  
•  First-in first-served: Projects would receive credit until the cap is reached. 
•  A previously agreed-upon cap on each buyer country.  
A rationing system operated by the CDM executive board would need to be based on a 
set of agreed-upon criteria. It would likely mimic a combination of a country cap, first-in first-
served, and the type of indirect limits discussed in the following section. Direct caps at a country 
level tend to lead to government control because there needs to be rationing within each country. 
Government control can reduce innovation and also lead to corruption because of the power it 
gives bureaucrats. Under first-in first-served, projects would have to be accepted before 
sequestration begins to provide some certainty to developers. As projects are accepted, the 
credits they anticipate creating would need to be saved by the executive board so that as the 
project progresses, the credits can be given out. First-in first-served with a strongly binding cap 
will tend to disadvantage the least-developed countries and concentrate activity in a few 
countries and maybe a few large projects.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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It would be hard to find fair rules for distributing a limited and strongly binding cap 
either under the CDM executive board or through seller caps. Caps on buyers do not inherently 
relate to the way the benefits under the cap are distributed because sellers receive the benefits. 
The easiest way to make a cap function as a total limit on risk would be to combine it 
with conservative rules on the creation of CERs. These conservative rules would automatically 
reduce the total number of CERs and hence make the cap less binding. With a weakly binding 
(or nonbinding) cap the benefits from being able to sell CERs would be small, and therefore 
equity would be less of an issue and we could just use first-in first-served to allocate the cap. In 
addition, the conservative rules would raise the average quality of CERs and reduce risk even 
further. 
Conservative rules may discourage some countries, particularly the least-developed 
countries, from creating viable projects. This equity and learning concern could be addressed 
through use of the adaptation fund. Projects could be subsidized through technical and practical 
assistance so that even under the strict rules, they would qualify and bring benefits to their host 
countries. If the conservative rules inhibit certain types of learning, individual countries, 
companies, or the UN could subsidize the necessary expertise as part of a research and learning 
program.  
Conclusion 
I conclude that it is possible to incorporate sequestration and storage in tropical forests in 
the CDM or a similar instrument. The problem of lack of permanence of sink credits is easily 
solvable with a requirement that the buyer pay back credits when sinks are removed. This 
solution also gives the sellers more control over their land use and hence reduces problems 
related to sovereignty. CO2 fertilization is not an issue in the context of developing countries 
because, handled correctly, it affects baselines as well as actual sequestration.  
The measurement of land use and carbon is not so easily solvable, but bias and 
manipulation could be avoided by using standardized rules that can be cross-checked. For 
example, the definition of forest could be chosen so that the forest area claimed can be verified 
by remote sensing. Carbon numbers for forest and nonforest areas could be standardized, and the 
numbers for highly uncertain carbon stocks, such as soil carbon, could be deliberately 
conservative. 
Baseline prediction is probably the most difficult issue. Creating baselines is similar to 
allocating property rights. The high level of uncertainty about the true business-as-usual path RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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means that updating baselines to reflect exogenous changes that affect land use will benefit both 
project developers and the international community. Baselines are probably easier to predict for 
large areas simply because the greater variability in historical data allows key coefficients to be 
estimated. Reforestation baselines are similar in difficulty to deforestation.  
By the law of large numbers, estimates of land use, carbon, and baselines are likely to be 
more precise when they are made on a larger scale. Thus, larger projects will have lower risk per 
unit of credit. Larger projects also face less leakage because many of the side effects occur 
within the area of the project. In addition, if a project encompasses a large area, its developers 
cannot strategically choose to site it where the rules are most favorable to them. Large projects 
are less likely to create bias and excessive credit creation. Nevertheless, during the period of 
experimentation, small projects may need to be facilitated to enhance participation of the least-
developed countries. In small projects the rules may need to be more conservative to account for 
concerns about bias, and credits could be discounted to account for leakage unless this can be 
directly addressed in the project design.  
Overall, simplicity, consistency across projects, and replicability will yield good results 
in the face of uncertainty. The rules need to avoid upward bias in the creation of credits and need 
to be perceived as fair. In the short run, to minimize total risk, we might want to deliberately bias 
the rules to make them more conservative to guarantee net environmental gains from the 
inclusion of sinks. These rules could be relaxed as we learn more and perceptions of risk fall. 
Because of short-run perceptions of high risk, the total amount of sinks could also be capped. If 
this were done at a level unlikely to be binding, with conservative rules well applied, a cap 
would not limit the market too much or require a complex rationing system.  
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Appendix 1. Generating Land Cover Baselines on a Large Spatial and Temporal 
Scale 
The baseline example given in the text was developed by an interdisciplinary research 
project led by Alex Pfaff (Columbia University) and Suzi Kerr (Motu) and funded by the U.S. 
National Science Foundation. The details of the derivation are given in Kerr et al. (2001c), and 
the project as a whole is described in Pfaff et al. (2000). 
The goal in creating this baseline deforestation forecast was to find a way to generate 
long-run, unbiased projections that cover broad areas while using relatively few data. The 
forecast is done based on a model for the whole country, so we can realistically assume that most 
causes of deforestation are derived within this area, most market interactions occur within the 
area, and institutional structures are reasonably common across the area. We would not expect 
significant leakage from Costa Rica to neighboring countries. We did not study reforestation 
because it has occurred only recently and would be more complex to model (see discussion in 
text). With improved data we hope to add analysis of reforestation. 
To forecast deforestation, we begin by trying to understand why people clear forests. In 
Costa Rica the primary cause is agricultural extension rather than logging (in which only the 
high-quality timber is removed). If we want to forecast for long periods, we need to understand 
the causes of deforestation. Short-term patterns may continue for a while, but they are unlikely to 
persist over 20 years or more as conditions change.  
Our model of human choices is based on individual decisionmaking. We assume that 
humans do the best they can for themselves and their families within constraints on their ability 
to borrow (either for investment or to cover short-term needs, such as education or medical help) 
and their access to information. We do not assume that we can perfectly predict their behavior. 
Because human behavior is complex, we want to model average observed behavior rather than 
build a model of specific parts of human behavior that we can study even if they yield a biased 
total picture. By studying past human behavior under a range of different conditions, however, 
we have some ability to predict the direction of response to new conditions and whether the 
response will be large or small. For example, if a new road is built—and in the past people have 
always cleared land near roads—they are likely to do so again.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Data 
Our basic data are from remote sensing coverage of all of Costa Rica: the early 1960s, 
1979, 1984, 1986, and 1997. These data distinguish forest and nonforest in all years and in 1997 
distinguish reforested areas from existing forest. For the current study the data are aggregated to 
the level of 436 districts. These data allow us to identify the patterns of deforestation across 
space and a long period of time.  
To explain these patterns, we use a range of variables. At a national level we use GDP 
per capita and population growth. We expect that as people become better off, at first they will 
use more land to produce more but later they will start to move toward producing services (e.g., 
tourism) and industrial goods (e.g., computer chips) that demand less land. In addition, as people 
become wealthier, they begin to value the environment more, and their government gains more 
capacity to protect it. Thus GDP growth will initially raise deforestation pressure but in the long 
run will reduce it. As a second measure of the development of the economy, recognizing that this 
varies significantly between regions, we use the percentage of population that is urbanized in 
each district. Temperature and precipitation in the district are summarized through the use of life 
zones that characterize different ecological conditions. These and measures of soil quality affect 
the likely agricultural productivity of the land.  
We also directly estimate the likely profitability of crops that can be grown in the area. As 
another measure of the quality of land that has not yet been deforested—and also the overall 
level of development of the district—we use the percentage of land in the district that has already 
been cleared. For example, we expect that flat land will be cleared first, so remaining forest land 
is more likely to be on steep slopes and hence less attractive. We use the deforestation rate in the 
last period to account for ongoing development toward the region’s potential (this is the basis of 
models that simply extrapolate past deforestation rates) and the effects of existing deforestation 
on access for clearing more land. Finally, we use distances to key locations (cities and ports) and 
the density of roads in a district to indicate the ease of access of farmers in the area to local, 
national, and international markets. 
Method 
To relate the history of deforestation to the behavior of individuals who cause it, we use 
regression techniques (Grouped logit). We aggregate the implications of individual decisions to 
the district level and then relate observed changes in land use with the characteristics of those 
districts.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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The results of this statistical analysis allow us to create a forecasting model that predicts 
future forest levels in each district (these are aggregated to the national level in Figure 5. We 
then use ecological data on the amount of carbon in different types of forests to translate levels 
of forest into levels of carbon to give the baseline carbon forecast in the text. 
 
Figure 5. Predicting forest levels from 1979 
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Generalizability 
These results cannot be directly applied to countries that have different ecological and 
economic characteristics. The method we developed, however, is broadly applicable. 
Understanding the important characteristics that drive deforestation and the nature of changes as 
development occurs would allow us to develop reasonable forecasts with considerably less data 
and work than was required for this first analysis. Most countries have at least one year of remote 
sensing coverage, many have life-zone maps and soil data, all have GDP and population data, 
and many of the other variables can be easily generated with a map. All our analysis could be 
replicated from anywhere in the world.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Kerr 
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Although this analysis requires some data and skill, the work involved is considerably 
less than that required to collect local data and do other onsite work to predict baselines. Locally 
generated baselines may be appropriate for small areas but are not feasible on a broad spatial 
scale. In particular, use of local knowledge may be more appropriate for domestic policies where 
aggregate environmental integrity is not so critical (because it is already ensured at the 
international level by international rules) but local equity is crucial. Such baselines will tend to 
be more precise on a site-by-site basis but are probably biased in aggregate.  
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The Role of Woody Debris in Forest Management for Carbon 
Olga N. Krankina* 
Introduction 
Carbon (C) sequestration is among the recent additions to the set of forest management 
objectives. It gives a new twist to several aspects of forest management. For example, it makes 
longer rotations (harvesting cycles) more attractive, and it provides an additional incentive for 
afforestation efforts and for enhancement of tree growth through various silvicultural practices 
(Binkley et al. 1997). However, these are incremental and predictable changes because such 
measures are already widely accepted as good and responsible forest management (e.g., 
Sampson et al. 2000); the monetary value of carbon merely provides additional support. On the 
contrary, the established management paradigm regarding tree mortality, logging residues 
(“slash”), and other woody debris has to be entirely reconsidered if the forest is managed for C. 
From the point of view of C sequestration, it does not matter in what ecosystem component the 
accumulation occurs, and therefore, C accumulation in woody debris may be just as valuable as 
C accumulation in live trees. This represents a reversal of the established negative view of 
woody debris as waste and indication of poor management. 
At the dawn of forestry, timber was the main objective of forest management, and the 
forestry practices focused on minimizing tree mortality and logging waste. An extensive set of 
practices was developed to achieve this goal, including thinning, choice of appropriate plantation 
density and species, fertilization, genetic improvement of planting stock, optimizing harvest 
rotation, disturbance control, and other techniques. A large body of research shows that many of 
these techniques are useful for increasing C stores in forest ecosystems. When concerns about 
biodiversity emerged and the need for retention of coarse woody debris (CWD) in forests 
became clear, it was seen as a sacrifice of productivity for the sake of wildlife. For that reason 
the transfer of material from live to dead wood is practiced at the minimal level needed to 
maintain wildlife habitat. Only in the context of forest management for carbon does woody 
debris become equal in importance and value to live wood. The role of woody debris thus 
                                                 
* Department of Forest Science, Oregon State University, Corvallis. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Krankina 
2 
represents a cardinal difference between managing forests for carbon and for any other objective. 
This difference is also frequently overlooked with major consequences for estimated effects of 
forest management practices on C stores.  
The role of woody debris is substantially different from that of fine litter and soils 
because management practices directly affect the input of material into the woody detritus pool. 
Timber harvest not only transfers live biomass into the forest products pool, it also produces a 
large, instant flux of material into the CWD pool and reduces future inputs into this pool from 
tree mortality. This input reduction naturally leads to long-term reduction in CWD mass, and 
very few models to date include this link. The difference between various management options is 
in effect the difference in quality, quantity, and timing of material flow into the forest products 
and woody detritus pools. To optimize the distribution of material flow for greater overall C 
storage, it is necessary to compare the fate of C in these two pools (Binkley et al. 1997). This 
paper shows why in most cases the adequate estimation of woody debris is a vital component of 
efforts to make C sinks operational and how it can be done.  
Can We Ignore CWD? 
In the past, estimation of C stores in forest ecosystems was performed in the context of 
scientific research. The transition from academic research on C pools and fluxes to operationally 
robust techniques for quantifying changes in C stocks is an ongoing process (Hamburg 2000; 
Boscolo et al. 2000). CWD is often among the first ecosystem components to be dropped in an 
effort to simplify C accounting. The argument is that counting dead trees as “committed C 
emissions” simply ignores some of C accumulation on the site and therefore provides 
conservative estimates with respect to C credited. Although this may be true for projects 
designed to sequester C through afforestation, in other types of C-offset projects, ignoring dead 
trees can lead to unrealistic projections of C benefits. For example, when the effect of protecting 
forests from logging is estimated, emissions from the logged forest form a baseline. The 
assumption that the biomass of all logged trees is instantly released into the atmosphere vastly 
exaggerates estimates of C losses in the near term and therefore the short-term benefits of a 
conservation project. On the other hand, long-term benefits of a conservation project may be 
underestimated when CWD is ignored. CWD plays a large role in C accumulation of old forests 
(Harmon et al. 1986, 2001). In rare cases where live biomass approaches equilibrium, 
accumulation of CWD may continue for many decades, even centuries.   
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It is also important to include CWD in estimating the effects of substitution. In regions 
where natural disturbance regimes are replaced by rotation forestry, the forest is maintained so 
that harvest equals net growth. The premise is that the forest can both be a source of wood 
products and still retain the captured C (Karjalainen et al. 1998). Thus, a considerable pool of 
carbon is permanently stored in the steady-state biomass while wood products continue to be 
generated with each timber crop, in a cumulative manner, substituting for fossil fuels. Although 
this approach is perfectly valid, it overlooks the management option that appears to be the most 
effective in increasing C stored within the next 100 years or so, namely forgoing timber harvest 
and allowing the forest to grow (Figure 1; Schlamadinger and Marland 1996). Accepting the 
“opportunity curve” as a baseline leads to the conclusion that sustainable forestry actually causes 
losses of C for the next 100 years even if forest products and fuel substitution are accounted for. 
Biomass accumulation beyond the age of harvest is certainly the major reason, but the growth of 
CWD stores also plays a role. Excluding CWD from consideration would clearly diminish the 
benefits of forgoing timber harvest, especially over longer time frames (beyond those shown in 
Figure 1).  
Timber harvest, whether by thinning or clearcut, has two major impacts on the CWD 
pool: It generates an instant flux of material into that pool, but more importantly it causes long-
term reduction in tree mortality—that is, future input into the CWD pool. Unfortunately, few 
existing models reflect this connection between forest products and the CWD pool. Replacing 
mortality with harvest is a clear and unequivocal benefit from the point of view of traditional 
forestry, and this is exactly the point where traditional forestry and C forestry diverge. To find 
out whether diverting material from mortality creates additional C stores, we have to compare 
the retention of C in CWD and in forest products, including the production pipeline (Figure 2). C 
sequestration in forest products can be a valid strategy, but only when the forest products pool 
provides more effective C storage than woody debris (measured as decomposition rate or 
average residence life) (Binkley et al. 1997). Model simulation of C accumulation in CWD and 
in forest products assuming common decomposition rates for the boreal and temperate zones 
(Figure 2) indicates that converting wood to short-lived products leads to significant losses of C. 
In other words, greater C sequestration can be achieved if trees are left in the forest than if they 
are converted to short-lived products. Medium-lived products store C more effectively than the 
dead wood of fast-decomposing species. Here again, treating dead trees as “committed 
emissions” would lead to projecting C benefits where there may be none. This probably 
represents the most significant omission in C accounting brought about by ignoring CWD.   
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Another example of overestimation of C benefit due to inadequate quantification of CWD 
involves measures to reduce the rate of natural disturbance. Fire control is often considered a 
measure to increase C stores in undeveloped boreal forests, such as those in Canada and in 
Russia. However, disturbances generally do not cause an instant loss of the entire C store. Instant 
releases following fire seldom exceed 10% of biomass; other types of disturbance release even 
less C. The transfer of live forest biomass to woody detritus actually provides longer-term 
retention of C than the majority of forest products because of the low decomposition rates of 
CWD in boreal zone.  
Many C-offset projects cause changes in species composition. Examples include 
plantations and an increased proportion of late successional species in landscapes where 
disturbance is controlled or nonclearcut harvest methods are practiced. Species that occur within 
the same region can have quite different decomposition rates and therefore different levels of C 
stocks in CWD for the same input rate (Figure 2). Other factors being equal, planting species 
with slower decomposition rates will produce higher C stores in CWD. Slow-decomposing 
species are in many cases late-successional ones. Conservation projects, which promote those 
species, will have an added C store in CWD relative to faster-decomposing species. Even for the 
moderate difference in decomposition rates shown in Figure 2, the difference in C stores can be 
substantial: For each unit of input into the CWD pool, the added equilibrium C storage is more 
than 15 units.  
Adequate accounting for CWD is important for many aspects of planning C-offset 
projects, such as selecting a time frame, addressing leakage, and designing a monitoring system. 
For example, excluding CWD from C accounting may result in invalid estimates of the role of 
young forests when trees are planted on a previously harvested site. Even when the removal of 
bole biomass from the site is very thorough, stumps remain, and so do the roots and usually 
branches. This material constitutes more than 20% of the live biomass of a mature forest (Cairns 
et al. 1997) and takes a very long time to decompose (Table 1). The amount of C lost in the 
process exceeds C accumulation in young trees for significant periods of time. Some studies 
estimate that it takes 30 years for C uptake in live biomass of young trees to balance the C 
release from slash (Cohen et al. 1996).  
Overlooking CWD in C accounting is unfortunately quite common. In fact, most of the 
recently published reports on operational C-offset projects do not include the CWD component 
(Brown et al. 2000a). One reason that incorporating CWD into C accounting has been slow is 
that the general public and even some professionals find it difficult to accept dead wood as a sink 
of C. Forestry tradition has certainly contributed to the strictly negative attitude toward dead  
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trees. Including biodiversity and C into the set of management goals can be expected to facilitate 
the recognition of the significance and value of CWD and, perhaps, an eventual change in public 
attitude. 
Methods and Techniques for Operational Quantification of CWD 
A major reason for ignoring CWD is the perceived difficulty of quantifying it. CWD 
stores may be difficult to assess because they vary significantly over succession and do not 
necessarily parallel the dynamics of live biomass. The amount of CWD is strongly influenced by 
disturbance (natural and anthropogenic) and characteristics of the previous generation of trees on 
a given site (Harmon et al. 1986; Clark et al. 1998; Krankina et al. in review). The existing 
experience with measuring CWD is certainly not as extensive and standardized as measurement 
of live wood. Nevertheless, methods are available and academic studies of dead wood have 
increased dramatically in the last two decades following the recognition of the importance of 
CWD for many aspects of ecosystem functioning (Harmon et al. 1986). Based on this research, 
operational techniques for estimating CWD are being developed and tested (Fridman and 
Walheim 2000; Krankina et al. in press; S. Brown pers. comm.). These and other studies of 
CWD have generated the data and expertise needed to include CWD into C accounting. 
Developing an operational system for quantifying CWD in the context of C-offset projects was 
not the intended purpose of our recent study of CWD in several major forest regions of Russia 
(Krankina et al. in review). However, we did an extensive study of CWD for all the major forest 
tree species across the full range of climatic conditions and disturbance regimes (Figure 3). The 
resulting dataset provides an opportunity to explore different options for simplification of 
estimation procedures for CWD.  
As for other biomass components, the goal is to measure change in CWD stocks over 
time. Protocols for field measurements of CWD have been developed (Harmon and Sexton 
1996), and there is significant experience in application of these field methods. Our study in 
Russia integrates three types of field data: (1) measurements of the bulk density of CWD on 
sample trees (Table 2), (2) CWD and live tree inventories in sample plots, and (3) forest 
inventory data. The first two types of data are examined below to identify strategies for 
developing cost-effective procedures to quantify CWD. The use of Russian forest inventory data 
for large-scale assessments is published elsewhere (Krankina et al. in review). 
Our primary goal in collecting data from individual dead trees was to establish a system 
of decay classes that associate a complex of visual characteristics of logs and snags (standing  
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dead trees) with bulk density values. We sampled 922 dead trees, representing major tree species 
in all the regions examined, for bulk density of wood and bark (Table 2). Sample trees were 
selected from five decay classes that covered all the stages of decomposition from nearly sound 
wood (class 1) to the most advanced stages of decomposition, when CWD material is soft and 
friable (class 5). Twenty visual characteristics of dead trees (e.g., extent of bark loss, moss cover) 
were recorded: 
 
Percent of bark cover on bole 
Presence or absence of needles or leaves 
Presence or absence of twigs 
Presence or absence of branches 
Presence or absence of bark on branches 
Presence or absence of bark on bole 
Sapwood sloughing 
Log is collapsing (unable to support its weight) 
Log’s cross section is elliptical 
Presence or absence of conks on bole 
Presence or absence of moss on bole 
Presence or absence of lichens on bole 
Presence or absence of carpenter ants 
Presence or absence of bark beetles or galleries 
Presence or absence of brown rot 
Presence or absence of white rot 
Sapwood can be crushed by hand 
Heartwood can be crushed by hand 
Log surface is hard but center is soft 
Branch stubs can be moved 
Presence or absence of wood borers or galleries 
 
Samples were taken from four cross sections 2 to 5 cm thick located systematically along 
the length of each log or snag examined. The bulk density of each sampled log or snag was  
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calculated as the weighted average, then the sample trees were grouped by species and decay 
class within each region, and mean densities were calculated for each grouping (Table 3a). These 
mean densities were used to compute masses of each CWD piece measured recorded in sample 
plots.  
The variation of density within each decay class was substantial, with the coefficient of 
variation (CV) ranging from 11% to 17% in decay class 1 and 20% to 48% in decay class 5. The 
differences between classes were not always significant (Table 3a). The five-class system—
designed for academic research and intended to reflect changes of a whole host of variables over 
the process of decomposition—probably resulted in collecting some field data that were redundant 
for purposes of density sampling. To quantify CWD stores, the system should focus exclusively on 
density; the statistically effective system of density classes might then be limited to fewer classes 
(Yatskov 2000). Analysis of the visual characteristics of our five decay classes showed that visual 
distinction of three classes might be more appropriate (Figure 4). The presence of bark, branches, 
and twigs is a good indicator of decay classes 1 and 2, for example, and friable and sloughing 
sapwood and heartwood and log collapse would distinguish the advanced decay classes (4 and 5). 
Overall, the most effective visual characteristics are associated directly or indirectly with wood 
mechanical strength, which is known to be linked to wood density. By pooling data from classes 1 
and 2 into a single class and classes 4 and 5 into another pool, a three-class system was developed 
(Table 3b).  
CWD was measured in 1,044 sample plots ranging in size from 0.1 to 1 hectare (ha). 
These plots represent the dominant tree species and different successional stages (recently 
disturbed forests and young to old-growth forest stands) in all seven regions examined (Table 2). 
To inventory dead wood in plots, we used our system of five decay classes. Measurements in 
plots included the end diameters, the middle diameter, and length of each piece of dead wood 
>10 cm in diameter and >1 m in length. All forms of CWD were inventoried, including snags, 
logs (dead and downed), and stumps (cut by harvest). Species and decay class of each piece were 
recorded and the mass of each piece was calculated by multiplying the computed volume by the 
average bulk density of CWD for a given species and decay class. An alternative and perhaps 
more cost-effective method is to use line transects to determine the volume of CWD in plots by 
species and decay class.  
It is important to include all types of CWD in plot inventories. In natural forests two 
types of CWD occur, logs and snags. In managed forests stumps form a third major type. The 
role of stumps can be substantial: In the mature, intensively managed forests of the St. 
Petersburg region, stumps represent up to a third of the total CWD store, and their biomass is  
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between 2 and 17 Mg/ha. The mass of logs is generally greater than the mass of snags, but the 
role of different types of CWD (logs, snags, and stumps) varies greatly.  
Can we estimate woody debris from live biomass, wood mass, or wood volume or other 
stand variables? In general the answer is no, because of the large variation in live biomass to 
CWD ratios. In our plots CWD constituted 2% to 96% of total above-ground biomass. However, 
grouping plots by region, species, and age groups allowed us to calculate significant ratios of 
CWD to live wood volume for middle-aged and mature forests (Table 4). In young forests the 
ratio varied widely, and this precluded the calculation of a meaningful number. We attributed 
this to the fact that dead wood found in young forest stands came from the previous 
(predisturbance) generation of trees, and consequently the amount of CWD did not correlate with 
the current volume of young trees in plots. For young forests, the mean volumes of logs and 
snags per unit area were calculated, and these volumes varied greatly among regions. In two 
western regions where managed forests prevail (St. Petersburg and Central), the stores of CWD 
were low, as in other regions where the prevailing disturbance type is clearcut harvest (Fridman 
and Walheim 2000). In contrast, natural disturbance, including fire and insect outbreaks, is a 
major cause of stand initiation in the eastern part of Russia, where young stands inherit large 
amounts of material from the previous forest stand (Table 4).  
Once the initial store of CWD is estimated, the change in this store over time can be 
either quantified by remeasurement (for monitoring purposes) or modeled (when changes are 
projected into the future). Models can use information on inputs through tree mortality and losses 
through decomposition. A global review of measured decomposition rates for many forest 
regions and species has been published recently (Harmon et al. 2001), but additional 
measurements are required, especially for the tropics. Inputs through tree mortality can be easily 
estimated when the forest is disturbed; however, background mortality in many forest types is 
still poorly studied.  
Detecting change in CWD stores may be accurate when these stores change rapidly (e.g., 
following harvest or natural disturbance). However, gradual changes (e.g., accumulation in older 
forests) may be more difficult to detect because of large variability of CWD stores within stands 
and landscapes. The number of observations required to detect this change within a decadal time 
frame may be cost-prohibitive. It was found that in soils, change in C content of less than 15% is 
virtually impossible to detect, and in most cases changes less than 30% are difficult to measure 
with any degree of accuracy (Homann et al., in review). Because variability in CWD C stores is 
generally similar to that in soils, monitoring C stores by repeated measurements is unlikely to 
produce reliable results when changes are expected to be small.   
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Yet another method of quantifying change in CWD stores is estimation based on the ratio 
of CWD to live biomass. The system of ratio estimators should be carefully set up with 
disturbance regime, stand age, and species group as primary design variables. Then, changes in 
CWD are estimated based on changes in live biomass and the transition of forest land from one 
category into another. Because it is well established that CWD does not generally correlate with 
live biomass, it is important to make the system of estimator ratios detailed enough to reflect, for 
example, the loss over time in CWD stores of young stands (which occurs while live biomass is 
increasing). It is also essential to apply these ratios only to the forests stands that were 
statistically sampled. Using these ratios outside these limits is clearly not acceptable. 
Conclusions 
Full consideration of woody debris dynamics is needed for a comprehensive assessment 
of C sinks in forest ecosystems and the effects of forest management practices on C stocks. 
Ignoring CWD may be acceptable in some cases, but it can undermine the integrity of many C-
offset projects.  
Operational measurement and monitoring methods for estimating C stocks in CWD are 
available or being established, and research data on processes that control C dynamics in CWD 
exist for many major forest regions. However, models and other operational estimation and 
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Table 1. The range of decomposition time (years) for each decay class and species 

































0 - 8 
7 - 65 
21 - 77 
39 - 160 
65 - 135 
0 - 8 
2 - 15 
5 - 71 
16 - 77 





Table 2. Field data overview: Sampling of CWD density and inventory of coarse woody 






  CWD and live wood volume 
inventory 
  Regions 
Species Sample 
trees 






















Populus tremula  20 young   
middle age 





   Khanty-Mansi okrug 
















   Krasnoyarsk krai  




















Far East  

















Total   922    1044 
 
a An additional 20 plots were set up in disturbed forests (including burned stands, wind-throw areas, and clearcuts) 
across all regions. 
b Central region includes the following administrative units: Briansk oblast, Vladimir oblast, Ivanov oblast, Tver 
oblast, Kaluga oblast, Kostroma oblast, Moscow oblast, Oriol oblast, Riazan oblast, Smolensk oblast, Tula oblast, 
Yaroslav oblast, Nizhnii Novgorod oblast, Kirov oblast, Republic Mari El, Republic Mordovia, Republic Chuvashia.RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Krankina 
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Table 3a. Mean densities (g/cm
3 + SE) of CWD by decay class and species for major tree species of Russia.  
Values marked by the same letter are not significantly different (ANOVA with the Tukey pairwise mean comparison test, 
p<0.05 (SAS Institute 1990)). 
Species 
Decay 










16 + 0.007 
0.3
33 + 0.037 
0.1
94 + 0.012 
0.1
20 + 0.005 
0.0























































Table 3b. Mean densities (g/cm
3 + SE) of CWD by decay class and species for major tree species of Russia 












2 + 0.020 
0.19
4 + 0.012 
0.10



































Table 4. Parameters for estimating CWD volume in forest stands with no CWD reported in the forest inventory database: 
Volume of dead wood in young forests and CWD:live wood volume ratio in middle-aged and older forests  




3/ha)  Middle age (%)  Mature and old (%)  Region
a Species 
group 
Logs Snags Logs Snags Logs Snags 
Northwest Hardwoods  2.5± 0.9 1.2± 0.3 5.7± 2.0 4.0± 1.4 
 Conifers 
9± 2 2± 1 
6.7± 0.9 4.4± 1.1 12.1± 1.6 3.0± 0.4 
Central Hardwoods  4.4± 0.4 2.1± 0.3 7.9± 2.0 3.0± 0.4 
 Conifers   
8± 2 2± 1 
3.9± 0.5 1.5± 0.3 7.8± 2.7 2.9± 0.5 
West Siberia  Hardwoods  7.0± 4.7 8.5± 4.6 5.5± 1.5 1.3± 0.2 
 Conifers   
6± 1 5± 2 
2.0± 0.4 1.5± 0.5 4.4± 0.5 1.9± 0.2 
East Siberia  Hardwoods  7.4± 1.4 3.7± 0.9 10.9± 2.1 4.1± 1.0 
 Conifers    8.4± 2.3 3.4± 0.9 7.6± 0.9 1.9± 0.3 
 Larch 
37± 11 22± 10 
9.0± 3.7 6.2± 1.5 11.2± 3.6 2.9± 0.9 
Far East  Hardwoods  4.1± 3.6 1.4± 0.3 24.8± 5.8 7.3± 1.7 
 Conifers    21.6± 3.6 9.1± 3.4 11.8± 2.9 9.1± 2.0 
 Larch 
92± 19 30± 6 
18.0± 7.3 4.6± 1.8 12.8± 2.9 7.1± 1.6 
a Administrative units within each region as in Table 1. 
b In young forests mean volume of logs and snags was calculated for a combined set of plots that included all species groups. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Krankina 
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Figure 1.  The “opportunity curve” in red shows C accumulation 
 for a scenario without timber harvest.  
Cumulative carbon-stock changes for a scenario involving afforestation
and harvest. These are net changes in that, for example, the diagram 
shows savings in fossil fuel emissions with respect to an alternate scenario 
that uses fossil fuels and alternative, more energy-intensive products to 































































































Decomposition control on C accumulation in CWD and forest products.
Curves 1 and 2 represent C accumulation in CWD for a constant mortality input of 1 Mg/ha/year 
(average for natural mortality in Eastern US (Brown and Schroeder 1999)) and decomposition 
rate constants 3.3% and 7 %.
Curves 3 and 4 represent C accumulation in forest products, long-lived and short lived forest 
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Figure 3. Schematic of forest regions where CWD stores were estimated: 1, St. 
Petersburg oblast; 2, Central region (see footnote to Table 1 for complete list of 
administrative units); 3, Khanty-Mansi okrug; 4, Novosibirsk oblast; 5, 
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Elements of a Certification System for Forestry-Based  
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Projects 
Pedro Moura-Costa∗  
1. Introduction 
During the last ten years, a variety of forestry projects have been established with the 
objective of sequestering, storing, or preventing the release of CO2 to the atmosphere to offset 
emissions taking place elsewhere (see, e.g., Moura-Costa and Stuart 1998 for a list). The number 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation projects1 is expected to increase after international 
agreement is reached on the use of forestry as a means to achieve the objectives of the Kyoto 
Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
Although there is still uncertainty about which modalities of forestry will be accepted for 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the protocol is explicit about the need for verification and, 
in the case of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Article 12), certification of project 
activities. This requirement for verification and certification is not yet specified in any official 
set of rules, regulations, or guidelines.  
In this interim phase, rules and regulations have been created by national GHG regulatory 
bodies (e.g., USIJI 1994; JIRC 1997) for the evaluation of projects under the activities 
implemented jointly (AIJ) pilot phase; specialized institutions (private sector, nongovernmental 
organizations, academic institutions) have developed their own methods for the quantification of 
the performance of GHG mitigation projects. It is likely that these early experiences will provide 
inputs for the formulation of internationally agreed-upon guidelines for verification and 
certification of carbon offsets. This paper describes the author’s views of the steps required for 
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1 A variety of terms have been used to refer to different project-level climate change mitigation mechanisms (Joint 
Implementation, JI, Activities Implemented Jointly, AIJ, Clean Development Mechanism, CDM) and their outputs: 
carbon offsets, carbon credits, emission reduction units (ERUs), certified emission reductions (CERs). This paper 
will use the generic terms ‘carbon offsets’ and ‘GHG mitigation offset projects’ to refer to all different technical 
formulations, with specific terminology used only as and when appropriate. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Moura-Costa 
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certification of forestry-based GHG mitigation projects. These steps also form the basis of the 
carbon offset verification service used by the international monitoring and verification firm 
Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) (Moura-Costa et al. 1997), which has been already 
applied to more than 15 projects in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. 
2. Institutional Requirements for Certification 
In this paper, verification is defined as the activity of checking the validity of the claims 
of a project, usually based on the data gathered by the project’s internal monitoring program. If a 
project fulfills all regulatory requirements, verification may lead to certification.  
Essential components of a verification-certification system include a published standard, 
an accreditation body, and certification agencies accredited to use the standard. The standard 
used for certification must be adopted by an independent standard-setting organization and must 
be accepted by the parties concerned. In the case of the standards developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO, the major worldwide standard-setting organization), 
technical committees work within the ISO framework (Upton and Bass 1995). In forestry, the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, an organization that certifies sustainable forest management) 
has established generic principles and criteria, and country-specific standards based on these are 
being set up by national working groups (Higman et al. 1999). But there is no universally 
accepted standard for certification of GHG mitigation projects. To address this issue, the 
organizations currently verifying the carbon offset claims of existing projects have used 
compilations of criteria from the project selection requirements of GHG regulatory bodies and 
carbon investment entities worldwide (e.g., the USIJI, the Canadian JII, the Australian AIJ Pilot 
Initiative, the Netherlands JIRC, the German AIJ Pilot Phase Programme, the World Bank 
Prototype Carbon Fund, and the Emission Reduction Units purchase tender of the Dutch 
Government). 
Certification agencies must be independent of the standard-setting body and the 
organizations seeking certification and must have well-defined procedures, guidelines, and 
training (Upton and Bass 1995). In the language of the protocol, certification companies have 
been referred to as operational units.  
To ensure credibility, the certification process must be overseen by an accreditation body 
independent from certification companies, ensuring consistency and compliance with the 
standard and certification procedures (Higman et al. 1999). In essence, accreditation bodies 
“certify the certifiers.” For certification of GHG mitigation projects, no accreditation body has RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Moura-Costa 
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yet been established. It is likely that this role will be filled by some accreditation body selected 
by the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC, possibly linked to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, the scientific advisory body to the UNFCCC). In the absence of an 
official accreditation body, verifiers have submitted their evaluation reports for peer review by 
internationally recognized experts.  
As the negotiation process stands, the verification of GHG mitigation projects has been 
divided into two phases: validation of project design, and verification and certification of the 
project’s achievements. These phases are further discussed below. It has been proposed that 
these activities be performed by separate operational entities to create a process of self-control by 
the verifiers themselves. Others suggest that this may burden the system and argue that the 
integrity of the system should be maintained by the accreditation bodies. 
3. Validation of Project Design  
The process of validation of project design can be divided into two phases related to the 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. First, a qualitative analysis must be performed to verify the 
suitability of the project according to eligibility criteria required by UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and GHG regulatory agencies. In particular, the Kyoto Protocol requires that projects 
“promote sustainable development” (Article 2) and result in benefits “additional to any that 
would otherwise occur”—that is, they must fulfill the additionality requirement (Articles 6.1b 
and 12.5c). Other requirements relate to host country approval and project externalities, both 
related to GHG (leakage) and unrelated to GHG (social, economic, and environmental impacts).  
Second, the GHG benefits of a project must be quantifiable in a “transparent and 
verifiable” manner. Consequently, the validation process must include a verification of the data 
and methods that will be used to quantify carbon offsets, determination of a “without project” 
baseline, and the projection of carbon benefits expected from the project. Inevitably, this initial 
analysis would be based on assumptions and projections and could not provide anything more 
than a forecast of the likely benefits.  
The initial validation should lead to the acceptance or rejection of the project as a valid 
GHG mitigation project. Additionally, from a developer or investor’s point of view, the 
assessment increases the credibility of the project and reduces risk to investors, especially if 
combined with a risk analysis. Certification, however, is accomplished only after an ex post 
analysis of project is conducted, based on real accomplishments.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Moura-Costa 
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4. Ex post Verification and Certification  
This stage of the process cannot take place until project activities have been 
implemented: It is not possible to verify something that has not yet occurred. Verification of a 
project requires a field visit. The frequency of such visits can vary and should be determined by 
the needs of the project developers or investors. During the field visits, certification companies 
(operational entities) must carry out the following activities: 
•  Determine whether the assumptions adopted for the project baseline remain valid, as 
political, social, economic, or environmental situations may change. In some cases, 
verification of the baseline is done through the establishment of control plots where 
the intervention is not implemented and business continues as usual. 
•  Verify the actual project activities (e.g., area planted). This can be achieved through 
satellite imagery, aerial photography, or field visits, depending on the scale of the 
project.  
•  Verify the project’s monitoring activities. Although quantification itself is not part of 
the verification process, certifiers must verify that the project’s internal monitoring 
program consistently utilizes appropriate data collection and quantification 
methodologies, as described in the validated project document. Methodologies may 
vary depending on data availability, project circumstance and design, and technology 
used, but some key elements must be addressed, as described elsewhere (e.g., 
MacDicken 1996; IPCC 1995; Greenhouse Challenge Office 1998). Verification 
should ensure that the data used for quantification are consistent with the project’s 
data records, and that the records match observations in the field. The data collected 
by the project staff need to be verified by book inspections and field sampling. 
•  Check the quantification methodologies. 
•  Adjust the results to account for uncertainty and measurement errors (see Section 5 
below). 
If satisfied with the results of the verification, the certification company then issues a 
certificate stating the amount of certified carbon offsets achieved by the project to date, 
completing the certification process. It is still being discussed who will have the authority to 
issue the actual carbon credits—the certified emission reductions (CERs) and emission reduction 
units (ERUs). Suggestions include the operational entities themselves, the host country, the 
Clean Development Mechanism’s executive board, and the Conference of the Parties (COP). RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Moura-Costa 
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Practitioners in this field would prefer a simple and expeditious process to avoid the delays of 
further deliberations. 
5. Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty  
Once the carbon benefits of a project have been verified, it is necessary to estimate the 
uncertainties and risks affecting such estimates.  In the context of GHG mitigation projects, 
uncertainty can be classified as mensuration error and counterfactual uncertainty. Mensuration 
error relates to the degree of uncertainty attached to a measurement, expressed as a standard 
error, or standard deviation of means. The amount of carbon credits to be authorized for use 
should, perhaps, deduct an amount for the anticipated error attached to the measurements. 
Counterfactual uncertainty relates to factors that cannot be statistically quantified, as in 
estimating the baseline. At the outset of the project, counterfactual uncertainty could be 
addressed by estimating the effect of uncertainty assumptions on the baseline during project 
implementation, and adopting a conservative scenario.  
Risk differs from the uncertainties described above because it relates to project 
implementation rather than to quantification of project benefits. Risks are particularly important 
in the case of forestry projects because they can lead to the “reversal” of carbon credits that may 
already have been issued. Risk relates to the likelihood and significance of particular events that 
may or may not happen, such as natural catastrophes (e.g., fire, floods, droughts, pests, diseases), 
anthropogenic interventions (e.g., encroachment, theft, fire); and sociopolitical, economic, 
financial, and market problems (e.g., nonenforcement of contracts, noncompliance with 
guarantees, expropriation, uncertain property rights, changes in costs and prices).  
A possible way to deal with risks is to create a carbon offset reserve that is kept for self-
insurance purposes during the project implementation phase. This approach was first used in the 
certification of the national program of the Costa Rican Office for Joint Implementation, which 
placed 40% of the project’s offsets in a self-insurance buffer reserve (SGS 1998). Another way 
to reduce risks of reversal of GHG benefits is to allow crediting only after a predetermined 
period of storage, or to provide credits yearly according to a ton-year factor (Moura-Costa and 
Wilson 1999). The ton-year approach has two advantages: It allows for carbon storage to be 
credited according to the time frame over which this service is provided, and it reduces the need 
for long-term guarantees and hence the risks associated with long time frames. If the project’s 
forests are damaged, carbon credits can be cancelled, and the amount of credits lost can be more 
easily calculated. RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Moura-Costa 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A wide range of methods, approaches, and criteria have been developed and field tested 
for the evaluation and quantification of the carbon offset benefits of forestry projects. 
Nevertheless, current lack of policy related to methods and guidelines to be used for certification 
of carbon offsets has resulted in large discrepancies between the claims of different projects. 
This, in turn, leads to uncertainty, discrediting forestry as a greenhouse gas mitigation option. 
There is therefore an urgent need for standardized procedures for project analysis to ensure 
consistent results and comparability between projects. In particular, agreement is needed on the 
protocols for determining baselines and additionality, the precision levels required for 
quantification, the treatment of uncertainty and mensuration error, methods for calculating 
project benefits, and the time frame used for project analysis.  
Independent verification and certification are a tool to increase credibility and 
transparency of project claims. As in any trading system, independent certification facilitates 
transactions by removing a layer of uncertainty and risk for a relatively small fraction of the 
overall transaction costs. In the case of GHG mitigation projects, it could enhance the legitimacy 
of the projects, and thus increase the comfort level of regulatory bodies, investors, and other 
interested parties.  
For certification to succeed, however, some components must be put in place. First, an 
internationally accepted standard must be adopted by the UNFCCC. Second, clear and objective 
guidelines for project analysis and quantification of project benefits must be defined. Finally, the 
UNFCCC must elect an accreditation body to certify and oversee the activities of the certifiers, 
adding a layer of transparency, credibility, and legitimacy to the system.  RFF Carbon Sink Workshop Proceedings  Moura-Costa 
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